
Roland Garros is one of the more stylish and elegant parts of Paris, and not a bad location to discuss finance and economics. Unfortunately, France’s political elite did not rise to the occasion. At the end of last week, (MEDEF), the large French business network gathered the principal candidates for the 2027 presidential campaign to listen to their views on the economy, and in particular their policies to pare back France’s gargantuan fiscal deficit and debt load. With a few exceptions, they disappointed.
The candidates for the far-left (Jean-Luc Melenchon of La France Insoumise) and far-right, Marine Le Pen of the Rassemblement Nationale, appeared to treat the event as a light-hearted post-holiday chat show, and not a forum to debate the faultline that could pitch the euro-zone into another debt crisis.
Though France’s presidential election is far off (the first round is on 18 April 2027), international investors need to pay close attention to it, both as a specific risk factor for bonds, foreign exchange and equities, and as a harbinger of what might befall most of the other major economies.
In this respect, France has at least two things in common with the US. First, its weak finances. The budget deficit has been stuck at 5%, a level historically associated with a recession, and debt to GDP is on course to hit 120% according to the OECD. Second, there is no appetite to tackle this dire fiscal situation. In the US, there is little prospect of corrective tax hikes or spending cuts, and the Trump administration appears to have a fetish for intervening in markets.
In France, three governments have been consumed by the process of setting a budget, and there is no political nor popular will to set France’s finances on a sustainable track. What is worse is that wild, populist suggestions that France could cancel the debt that the Banque de France holds (as a result of quantitative easing) are being aired in the media. France’s political class and populace are not known for their financial literacy, and the belief in some quarters that debt can be magicked away is dangerous and sets the economy up for a sharp reality check.
Having witnessed the brutal effect of a debt crisis and the subsequent austerity on the Irish economy from 2010 onwards, French policymakers and its public are badly unprepared for what may come. Government spending at 57% of GDP is comparatively huge, and much of this goes on social welfare (healthcare and pensions).
Unlike the US, France is not enjoying an AI capital expenditure fuelled wealth effect, and the notion that it might act to structurally boost economic growth is anathema to nearly all of its politicians. In a demonstration of moral hazard, France has accumulated debt at a pace and amount more than any other euro-zone country, without much protest from the ECB.
Markets however, are reacting. French ten-year bond yields have just passed Italy’s. While long-bond yields in Japan, the US and UK have all broken higher to multi-decade highs, the re-rating of France is troubling. For international investors, France’s changing status, from a core, safe haven, to a periphery market is one of several signals of a coming debt purgatory – a long period where indebtedness dominates markets, government politics and geopolitics.
For European policy makers, the fact that France is the indispensable nation on geopolitics, defence and military innovation complicates matters because it means that politically, in the context of German underperformance, France is harder to corral into a fiscal straightjacket in the same way the European Commission did with Greece, Ireland and Spain. On the European political stage, there is no-one fiscally credible politician who might stand up to France and avert the potential for contagion across the euro-zone.
If for instance, both Melenchon and Le Pen make it through to the second round of the presidential election, bond investors will desert France, French bank share will collapse, luxury goods firms will become bargains, and the euro will likely fall. Bond investors will likely rush to the few safe havens the euro-zone offers – Germany, the Netherlands and Ireland as well as assets in ‘old’ periphery countries like Norway and Switzerland.
More broadly, a continued rise in French yields, in the face of policy inaction (a draft budget is to be presented to parliament at the end of September), will for the first time in over a decade sensitize international investors to the credit risk inherent in government balance sheets. What is intimidating is that here France is in good company, most of the major economies, China, Japan, the UK and the US are as indebted as it is.
