During a visit to the London School of Economics in November 2008 Queen Elizabeth II demanded about the debt bubble, “Why did nobody notice it?”. She might ask the same about the onset of the coronavirus crisis, particularly of her prime minister and her eldest son. The defining characteristic of the coronavirus crisis has been its speed. For example, markets have fallen by the same magnitude as during the dot.com crisis, but this time the fall took 16 days not 16 months.
The speed is explained by the sudden restriction placed on human movement by the crisis, and the fact that in general we are used to dealing with single set piece economic or financial crises (market bubble, classic recession, regional – EM or EU – crisis) and not five overlapping crises at the same time. The speed and drama of the crisis is heightened by the fact that it is breaking things – diplomatic relations, investment funds, political careers and economies.
The policy response has not, as I have outlined in previous mails – been well coordinated between fiscal and monetary policy, nor between nations. That so many policy makers repeat Mario Draghi’s mantra of ‘do whatever it takes’, betrays the fact that the magic of those words is vested in Draghi himself.
Still monetary and fiscal support has come thick and fast and will help stem market pain. My worry is that given we are at the late stage in a very long expansion, it will be harder for policy to significantly boost trend economic growth. Of the other policy measures – the quest for vaccines and treatments is the most exciting, whilst Russia and Saudi Arabia’s adherence to their oil price war is the most disappointing.
From here, I see three scenarios.
Easter: Under this optimistic case (25% likely) the fruits of isolation in Europe begin to show, the race for treatments and vaccines is promising, while central bank liquidity dampens market distress. As such, workers, companies and governments begin to get a sense as to the parameters around the crisis and some visibility as to when and how it can be managed. A slow return to ‘normal’ then begins in Europe and the US in late April. Stock markets hit new highs in October and Donald Trump stays in the White House.
Summer: ‘Isolation’ is increasingly debated on ethical, economic and political grounds. It proves hard to enforce across America and harder still to prosecute in emerging economies. Under this ‘main’ scenario (55%) the second derivative in infections and macroeconomic indicators only begins to significantly improve in mid-summer. As a result, many businesses close or are near to ‘broken’, despite fiscal support. At the same time, investment in ‘newer’ industries – data (5G, AI, Cloud), healthtech and digital finance is accelerated. Still, high unemployment and low trend growth are significant policy issues into 2021.
Winter: Under this ‘pessimistic’ (20%) scenario, much of the world’s workforce is disrupted by the virus, and second waves become the norm. Social unrest, political disunity and a breakdown in diplomacy between nations (US and China for instance) are some of the resulting side-effects. Monetary and fiscal policies cannot contain the full effects of bankruptcies and unemployment, to the extent that central banking ‘accidents’ crop up. The 1930’s is the nasty template to follow here. Property markets and alternative asset classes like private equity are hard hit.
While broad scenarios are useful for framing problems, they are often overly simplistic. One distinction to draw here is between the short to medium term return to normal in terms of end of isolation and return to work, and the enduring long-term imbalances that result from, and are exacerbated by this crisis.
Ideally, following a two-month period of isolation in the US (taking us to mid-May) a return to normal might be in sight.
However, under the surface of the world economy the following trends will have been deepened by the crisis – the end of globalization and the resulting multipolar world, the biggest debt load since the Napoleonic Wars and central banks who are running out of effective policy measures. In the alphabet soup of U, V,L and W shaped recoveries that forecasters talk about, we might well have a cyclical V, followed by a structural L.
With three of the G7 leaders now in quarantine, world political leadership is under strain. It has two battles to fight – beating the virus, and then resolving the end of globalization in as constructive and imaginative a way possible.
With best wishes