A Good Read

An emerging trend in our screen driven societies is that fewer people are reading books. A YouGov poll found that 40% of Americans did not read a book in 2025, though nearly all of them consumed streaming services and social media. Other studies, from the National Endowment for the Arts and Bureau of Labor Statistics highlight that younger generations read less, and a number of studies (such as the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) attainment scores) show that reading proficiency in many high-income countries is declining. Worse still, AI is taking over writing, to the extent that the FT ran a headline last week ‘The new premium product: books written by people’

A counterargument is that people are consuming fiction and non-fiction in different forms (such as audio books) but, in my view, it’s just not the same. Reading involves consuming ideas with the ‘brain-on’, and by not reading we miss out, not only on great tales, but the lessons of history, human behaviour and the world we live in.

However, I know that most of my readers love books, and as I head off on holiday, I want to recommend a few titles. I divided these into two categories, the books I ought to have read (non-fiction), and the books I really wanted to read (fiction). In that spirit, I packed my bag with a couple of serious books, but once I settled into the hotel, I found a cheap thriller written in 2006 that I read instead.

Starting with the serious books, I packed ‘Twilight of the Dons’ by Colin Kidd, not a text that will grace many beaches I imagine. The book recounts a period when academics had a much more vaunted position in British public life (it was said that the motorway from London to Oxford was built so that ministers could leave Westminster in the evening to dine at All Soul’s College).

The book bolsters the view that one of the reasons for the crisis that Britain finds itself in is the desiccation of education and learning, in terms of the devaluation of the idea of education as a public good, diminished funding from the state and the strange preference for overseas students over British ones in the best schools and universities. I had a vague hope that Andy Burnham, the first Cambridge educated prime minister (a student of Literature) might encourage a more learned approach to government, even if his first week in office leaves me lukewarm.

Then, the book I am really looking forward to reading is ‘1873’, by Liaquat Ahamed. His first book ‘Lords of Finance’ related the emergence of central banking in the US and Europe in the 1930’s and is one of the best economics books I have read, and a work that was clearly written with great passion.

‘1873’ relates the events around the market panic and financial crisis of 1873, a period of ‘true capitalism’ in the sense that then there were few of the policy guardrails we have today. Apart from Ahamed’s writing, the book is relevant today for its detail on the railway investment boom, and the subsequent deep recession that followed the Panic of 1873. In that context, there is an alarming rise in books whose titles recount financial collapse, another one is Andrew Ross Sorkin’s ‘1929’ which is rich in detail on the social and political context of the 1929 crash.

To finish my economics recommendations, another question that besets commentators and investors is the future of the dollar. In 1976, the economist Charles Kindleberger declared ‘The dollar is finished as an international money, but there is no clear successor’. This view is largely correct, but the prospect that America’s power is diminishing, may have consequences for the dollar, and there is a flurry of new books on the role of the dollar, of which books by Barry Eichengreen (Money beyond Borders), Ken Rogoff (Our Dollar, Your Problem) and Paul Blustein (King Dollar) are prominent.

One book I have mentioned in recent notes, and that I reiterate is Giuliano da Empoli’s ‘The Hour of the Predator’, which succeeds in capturing the spirit of our political times. We have moved from a period of democracy and technocratic engagement between nations, to a lawless one, dominated by autocrats and oligarchs, who vandalise laws, norms and institutions under the false premise of enacting change. The principal lesson today is that centrist politicians, Keir Starmer was the example, need to stop becoming ‘prey’ and change their tactics.

Then, more specifically on AI, last week I wrote on the speed at which the sector is evolving and find it hard to recommend books that can keep pace with this (the best source I have is Azeem Azhar’s Exponential World blog). So, I fall back on Carlota Perez’ framework in ‘Technological Revolutions and Financial Capital: The Dynamics of Bubbles and Golden Ages’. Another useful book in this context is Johan Norberg’s ‘Peak Human’ which describes the emergence of empires, their deployment of technology and sketches the lessons for our world.

Now, with the holidays really in mind, I jump to non-fiction. One of the best books I have enjoyed this year is Alex Starritt’s ‘Drayton and Mckenzie’ is an absorbing story of two entrepreneurs, written in a stylish, mischievous way that does an excellent job of capturing the prevailing economic trends of the past twenty years.

Also, some of my favourite writers have released new books in the past year – William Boyd’s second, amusing Gabriel Dax story ‘The Predicament’ (with ‘Cold Sunset’ out in September), and Ian McEwan’s ‘What We Can Know’. I’ve just read the first of John Banville’s ‘Quirke’ series (Christine Falls) and recommend it, together with the latest in the series ‘The Drowned’ and ‘The Lock Up’. If readers are looking for classics, I propose Bram Stoker’s ‘Dracula’ for a summertime scare.

In the realm of thrillers, an entertaining, new writer I have come across is David McCloskey, a former CIA analyst, co-presenter of the fun podcast ‘The Rest is Classified’, and already author of four espionage thrillers, the latest of which ‘The Persian’ I recommend.

I’ve just finished reading Nick Fox Weber’s book ‘The Art of Tennis’, which is remarkable for the quality of his writing and the breadth of his knowledge of sport, American society and art. It set my mind searching for comparable writers on sport, and the one who comes to mind is the late David Halberstam, I loved his book ‘The Amateurs’.

Enjoy, Mike

Cheap and Cheerful

Quite some time ago I attended a seminar by Carlota Perez, a British-based Venezuelan scholar whose work focuses on the ways in which technological innovations, finance and economics work together to produce great waves or periods of investment and periodically, prosperity. At the time, books like Thomas Kuhn’s ‘The Structure of Scientific Revolutions’ were fresh in my mind, as was the recent aftermath of the dot.com bubble.

Perez’ work (much of which is on her website) is best explained by the title of her well known book ‘Technological Revolutions and Financial Capital: the Dynamics of Bubbles and Golden Ages’, where she describes the phases that accompany technological innovations as they acquire investment and begin to ripple through economies, and change the structure of those economies. In common with scholars of developmental waves (for example she was awarded the Kondratiev Silver Medal in 2012) she maps how major technological revolutions (such as the 18^th century Industrial Revolution, steam engines, railways, manufacturing in the form of automobiles and oil drilling for instance, and telecoms/internet) develop in phases.

The principal phases she outlines begin with the Installation phase, where capital rushes towards the new technology, fuelling the build of new infrastructure and new sub-industries and economic activity, but also driving asset bubbles which inevitably crash or hit a ‘turning point’ as she politely puts it. The next phase is ‘Deployment’ where the new technology is widely used, and public policy, regulation and society accommodate it. Investment-wise, the economic applications of the technology enter into the mainstream. Readers will quickly spot the relevance to the AI capital expenditure boom.

An interesting distinction Perez makes, which I think is highly relevant, is that between ‘financial capital’ by which we can understand fast moving speculative money, and ‘production capital’ which is devoted to building of specific technologies, skills and infrastructure and is by nature more ‘committed’. Nicolas Colin, a French economist has written a lot on the emergence of ‘production capital’ in his blog, Drift Signal. I am tempted to say that Europeans might hold that ‘financial capital’ is American and ‘production capital’ is European, but Europe has a deficit of both.

It seems to me that the difference between AI and the historic phases of technological innovation mentioned by Carlotta Perez, is speed. The speed with which models are improving, the speed with which capital is being deployed, the take-up by users, and the speed with which the winners and losers are emerging at the corporate level.

A couple of months ago, we wrote about the mixture of wonder and panic created by Anthropic’s Mythos model. Then, it was assumed that Chinese developers were some seven months behind the Americans, but last week, Moonshot, the Chinese AI developer released test results of its Kimi K3 model (conveniently, they are in the middle of a fundraise), which apparently match some of the capabilities of Mythos. There has not been much of a market reaction to this in the US but, the red-blooded capitalists of Silicon Valley and the AI industry are crying alarm, running for Washington and calling for the US government to ban Chinese models.

Their dismay, consistent with the Perez framework, portends a speedy evolution in the structure of the international market for AI tools. China’s models are much cheaper than those in the US, partly because they piggyback on work done by the Americans, partly because of cheaper energy in China, and partly because of fierce competition amongst Chinese developers (and the winners get a boost from the Chinese government). In the near future, those who want cheap, cheerful and clever AI tools may well gravitate to the Chinese AI products (as Germans are now doing with Chinese cars, see last week’s note, Is China OK?))

The American AI models will still be useful for a number of things. The first is that they will continue to lead frontier AI development, in analytical power, and increasingly on specialised datasets and applications. Secondly, they will be favoured by Western corporates, especially in closed systems, and thirdly, they will continue to have a strategic role – either in applications across nations (from security, warfare or healthcare for example) or as strategic exports (here I am thinking of G42, the UAE’s AI firm that has an exclusive relationship with US AI models).

To that end, capital will flow more to cutting edge AI, sovereign AI and secure corporate AI in the US, and very likely in Europe (Mistral, Europe’s last hope is currently raising capital at a measly Eur 20 bn valuation). In my view, we are still some way away from a ‘reckoning’ in AI stocks, and proof of the hubris in the market is that the large investment banks involved in the SpaceX IPO continue to issue research notes, with embarrassing justifications for their lofty price targets (Morgan Stanley thinks SpaceX, which trades at USD 135 is worth USD 300).

Still, markets are beginning to sniff the weaker players – Oracle, whose balance sheet is far weaker than rival hyperscalers, has seen its value halve in the past two months. Writer Sebastian Mallaby, amongst others has stated that there is a high risk that OpenAI might run out of money. For the time being, the show goes on.

Have a great week ahead, Mike

Is China OK?

China's economy grows at one of lowest rates in decades

For much of the last decade or so, Chinese friends and acquaintances, as well as many people I know in Singapore and Hong Kong, have remarked that their view of Europeans is a lazy and decadent people, too tolerant of the problems that beset their societies. This view is in part gentle mockery, and part sincere. Europeans, not used to being mocked, will look up from their Aperol spritz and ask what they are doing wrong?

Indeed, according to the latest (and fourth) University of Alberta ‘How China sees the World’ survey, it seems that most Chinese don’t rate the EU as a major geopolitical player, though a significant economic partner and more importantly, a tourism destination.

The survey highlights that the Chinese have a strong view of their country’s importance on the international stage, pitting it ahead of the USA in a bi-polar world order. The interesting elements in the survey are the casting of Russia as an indispensable, trusted partner on the international stage for China, and the confidence with which participants gauge a war with Japan as a likely geopolitical event.

To an extent, it is welcome to consider Chinese views on the rest of the world, granted the irony that for such an important economic and geopolitical player, there are relatively so few Western experts on China, and in Western public discourse there is not a well-developed conversation on Chinese culture and politics. Consider that there are very few Irish public figures who know China well, and the evolution of China’s economy does not get enough detailed attention in the Irish media, despite China’s enormous role in the world economy.

This might be because China makes it increasingly difficult for outsiders to understand it. In the past seven years, Western investment in China has dropped significantly, and the flow of Westerners to work in China has also fallen. A further illustration is that there are now fewer than 2000 Americans studying in China according to the Straits Times (down from 11,000 in 2019) while there are still some 250,000 Chinese studying in the US (down from 354,000 in 2019), and a further 150,000 Chinese studying in the UK (and close to 4,000 in Ireland).

The reduced social, political and commercial connection between China and the West makes it harder to read what is happening to the Chinese economy, with the additional concern that official Chinese data is not helpful either. Granted that China last week printed one of its lowest official GDP growth readings, this is a significant hurdle. Indeed, there is a sense amongst many Western economists that only an amalgam of very detailed, micro indicators (e.g. electricity usage) can help build a picture of what is really happening in the Chinese economy.

For example, In the USA, the Conference Board has reconstructed China’s economic data, and has concluded that not only has the performance of the Chinese economy overestimated, but it has been driven by the flow of huge amounts of capital into the economy that has steadily become less productive (in the sense that one dollar of capital leads to a decreasingly small return). It may be that the Conference Board team has gotten it wrong, but there is simply neither the forum nor the spirit for an open debate on Chinese data. Also, a prominent Chinese economist Gao Shanwen, who died of cancer last month, had stated publicly that the trend rate of growth in China is far lower than official figures suggest.

Despite that, the most interesting element is that the Chinese authorities have managed their economy better than most have thought, and to use a headline from the New York Times, China’s economy ‘has failed to fail’ in the sense that it has not had an obvious cyclical recession in decades.

If there is a strategy behind this, it looks from afar, as the state pushing activity from one economic engine to another. The Chinese property market has steadily deflated over the past six years, and the financial consequences of this have in my view not fully registered with banks and households. At the same time, through a mixture of state guidance and ruthless industrial competition, China has shifted the locus of activity to manufacturing (and the last Plenum, policy making forum, has ordained deep tech as the spearhead of the Chinese economic effort).

One consequence has been the creation of over-capacity, but in goods of sufficient quality and low production cost, that they displace European markets. Last week, exports of Chinese cars to Europe have just topped a monthly tally of 1 million, while European manufacturers (even Porsche) are struggling in China. The result is a crisis of confidence in German manufacturing, and a policy debate on how to curb the flow of Chinese exports into Europe.

In the past year, China has pursued an ‘involution’ policy, of reducing spare capacity across a range of industries, but this does not yet appear to have borne fruit and raises the risk that there is still a lot of operational leverage in the economy. Two other risks loom. One consequence of the funding of real estate and manufacturing through the banking sector is that in terms of assets, China’s banks are amongst the largest in the world, a systematic risk in the event of a downturn, and its public (including local and regional authority) debt, is dangerously high.

With trading partners, such as Germany, beginning to react to China’s export boom, the policy options for Beijing are increasingly limited as they try to maintain economic momentum. Another bad GDP print and investors will start to fear the worst.

Have a great week ahead, Mike

You’re in the army now

At a recent dinner event three people, myself included, referenced Valery Gerasimov, chief of the general staff of the Russian army, and famous in geopolitical circles for a 2013 essay where he outlined the concept of ‘total war’ as seen through Russian eyes. It is a view of conflict that covers many strategies such as cyber, border testing, propaganda, intensive social media and covert attacks, for example. This approach has been very much on display across Eastern Europe and the Baltics – the encouragement of discord in Bosnia, the hollowing out of Hungarian politics and in particular the harnessing of Belarus as a form of geopolitical attack dog. Indeed, the fact that General Gerasimov has entered our minds is a sign that the doctrine is succeeding.

An excellent steer as to the tactics of ‘total war’ is David Kilcullen’s book ‘The Dragons and Snakes’ where he examines the new, unconventional forms of conflict pursued by the likes of Russia and China. One striking example Kilcullen describes is Russia’s efforts to drive immigrants and asylum seekers through the border with Norway, the aim being to test Norway’s reaction, its border security and to generally aggravate NATO.

Total war is highly effective. The ongoing destabilisation of adversaries through unconventional means is relatively cheap and effective, especially so when many governments in the West refuse to publicly acknowledge the manipulation of the infrastructure of democracy and public life. Other efforts, such as assassinations and the incursion of drones and jets into European airspace, with the added spice of cyber-attacks, are harder to ignore. They likely amount to signs of Russia stressing and probing European defences, and most importantly, testing the commitment of the US to NATO.

In this respect, NATO should be highly focused and motivated, but in the context of its gathering in Ankara, consistent with the view that all of the institutions of the post WW2 era are unravelling, dangerously on the brink of irrelevance. The danger is that it ceases to be an alliance, and instead serves as a mere organisation.

The reasons for this are well known. Whilst military level ties between the likes of France and America are very strong, Europeans (and Canadians) fear that Europe and the US no longer share the same enemy and worry that even in a post Trump 2.0 world, the stance of the US will not revert to an embrace of NATO.

In short, if NATO’s Article 5 was to be invoked, Europeans are still (despite comments from the summit) not convinced that the US would pick up the phone. Indeed, the only person to have triggered Article 5, Ambassador Nick Burns (former US ambassador to NATO who triggered Article 5 on 9/11) has said that Donald Trump’s repeated view that he wants to ‘take’ Greenland, is ‘breaking the bonds of trust’.

To that end, many officers in European armies increasingly regard the NATO command structure as an organisational framework through which European armies can coordinate, plan and organise, and to that end it still has value. Europe is re-arming, and as Germany showed this week, balance sheets are swelling with the issue of new debt to finance defence spending. This re-armament is urgent, in view of warnings from intelligence agencies of a clash with Russia within the next five years. One nod to this risk is the upgrading at the NATO summit of the Baltic Air Policing mission to an air defence one.

By their nature, democracies are vulnerable to the tactics of ‘total war’ and the rise of social media has made populism an easy and attractive strategy, and thoughtful rebuttal a near impossible one. Two important reminders of this came last week.

Nigel Farage, who according to some is Britain’s prime minister in waiting appears to have made a tactical error in resigning his Westminster seat, so as to recontest it. Farage did so in order to head off an inquiry into donations he has received (note that the former head of Reform in Wales is serving a lengthy jail sentence for pro-Russia bribery). With the exception of the satirical independent candidate Count Binface, no other parties will contest the seat, undermining Farage, with potentially enormous consequences for British politics given the rise in popularity of Reform.

Across the Channel, where on repeated occasions the French authorities have warned of foreign influence in French elections, the French judiciary have confirmed Marine Le Pen’s culpability in a finance scandal, but effectively opened the way for her to stand in the 2027 presidential election. The court battle is not yet over, and Le Pen will face several constraints (possible house arrest or electronic bracelet). Most voters should feel disdain in voting for a politician convicted of corruption, though Nicolas Sarkozy stills enjoys an allure in France.

But, Le Pen, whom Emmanuel Macron has accused of being funded by Russia, will likely play the martyr card, that the elitist French system is set against her. She has a hard-core support approaching 30% of the electorate, and the only person who can stop her is Edouard Philippe, the former prime minister, who has been far too mild mannered. He needs to take note from the evisceration of Keir Starmer, otherwise the next NATO summit in Tirana in 2027, may be marked by Marine Le Pen leading France out of NATO’s command structure.

Have a great week ahead, Mike

Modern Times

On May 15, 1932, there was an attempted coup d’etat in Japan, led by a militant, nationalistic faction in the Imperial Army. The principal victim was the Japanese Prime Minister, Inukai Tsuyoshi. The perpetrators of the coup were given relatively light prison sentences, a pointer to the less democratic and belligerent Japan that would soon follow.

The bizarre element of the coup, which fortunately did not succeed, was a plan to murder the actor Charlie Chaplin. The thinking was that such a deed would incite popular fury in the US, and thus lead to war, in which Japan would prevail. At the time of the coup, Chaplin was watching a sumo wrestling match with the Prime Minister’s son, and thereby escaped the assassins.

This was more than lucky and in many ways Chaplin’s film The Great Dictator is a fine riposte to the destructive nationalism and totalitarianism that took hold across the world from the mid 1930’s. It is a film that still resonates today in our world of ‘predators’.

While our view of Japan today is of a placid, highly civilized country, its history in the past two centuries is a reminder of the pitfalls of isolationism, nationalism and war – concerns that are now echoing louder across the international political economy debate. It should be said at the same time that the post second world war relationship between the US and Japan is a good example of how two feuding countries can come together (Al Alletzhauser’s ‘House of Nomura’ is good on this topic).

Yet, such was Japan’s economic rebound after the second world war that America feared the rise of Japan as it now does China, and fans of economic history may know that during the 1980’s and 1990’s Donald Trump was an eminent Japan-trade basher. For instance, the April 13 1987 cover of Time magazine carried an image of Uncle Sam pitted against a sumo wrestler under the banner ‘Trade Wars – the US gets tough with Japan’ (the stock market crashed five months later).

Now, following decades lost to the after-effects of its economic crisis, Japan is undergoing an awakening, spearheaded by the historic election of the first female prime minister of Japan, Sanae Takaichi. This awakening takes different forms, a more assertive diplomatic stance on China, a ramping up of defence spending amidst greater public comfort with the idea of Japan as a budding military power. Also, Japan’s government is ambitious for its economy and has announced a record state budget of 122 trillion yen (over Eur 600 bn), and Japanese firms like Softbank are in the vanguard of the AI boom.

There are two other financial aspects of this awakening. In an attempt to revitalize the Japanese economy, the Bank of Japan had kept interest rates at or below zero for some time. It has abandoned that policy recently and with both growth and inflation picking up, bond yields have surged. For much of the last fifteen years, the ten-year bond yield in Japan has been well below 1%, but in 2024-25 normalised toward the 1.5-2% range, and is now 2.7%, whilst the longer term 30-year bond yield is 3.95%.

As one of the world’s most indebted countries (Japan’s headline public debt to GDP ratio is well over 200% according to the IMF), the effect of this is that fiscal policy is increasingly smothered by the effect of interest payments on that debt, and policy is trapped between trying to grow the economy, control inflation and not upset the bond market.

Equally the yen is grabbing attention, falling to a forty-year low this week. Indeed, it might well be lower, but traders are wary of a market intervention by the Japanese authorities. There are several factors driving this, the hedging of foreign exchange risk by investors buying Japanese assets, real interest rate differentials, and worries over the effects of expansionary fiscal policy. A costly bout of yen intervention might be close.

As Japan’s asset prices hit records for largely the wrong reasons, it serves as a reminder that many large indebted economies exist on a financial tightrope between growth and calamity. Britain is the most prominent example, but Japan is a more systematic case and over the summer could be the source of a market wobble, if not outright crisis as bond market sell-offs become more common in our ‘age of debt’.

It’s all enough to make me think of Charlie Chaplin’s depression era film Modern Times.

Have a great week ahead, Mike

Irrational Exuberance

In most countries, central bankers are anonymous bureaucrats, and rightly so. In America, this is not so, thanks largely to the size of its economy and financial markets, culture of personality and fabled role of the Federal Reserve. In the past sixty years, the chiefs of the Fed have been household names, though most of them will have been uncomfortable with this level of attention. Like the characters in the Wizard of Oz, the career of each Fed chief has been characterised by a particular character trait – Paul Volcker was courage exemplified, Ben Bernanke displayed great intelligence under pressure, Janet Yellen was scholarly, and Jerome Powell was calm and patient (with his president).

Amongst them, Alan Greenspan, who died last week at the age of 100, was the governor who elevated the Fed to its mythical status, and who through his eighteen years at the helm of the central bank, captured markets with his ‘delphic’ form of communication. It is worth repeating that Greenspan once quipped to a reporter that ‘If I seem unduly clear to you, you must have misunderstood what I said’.

At the time, central bankers spoke less to journalists and were far less transparent in their communication. Kevin Warsh the new Fed chief wants to return towards this approach though he might bear in mind that, so sparing was Greenspan in his messaging, that market watchers tried to guess changes in monetary policy from the size of Greenspan’s briefcase.

Greenspan was an unusual central banker in terms of the trajectory of his career, he had made a name on Wall Street as a consulting economist with a focus on very detailed sector level data. Through the 1987 crash, crises in Russia, Asia, Latin America and the hedge fund LTCM, he won the confidence of investors, but critics will argue that he ultimately allowed himself to become seduced by Wall Street and failed to adequately regulate it in the run up to the global financial (housing) crisis.

Many of the obituaries of Greenspan will focus on his role as ‘Maestro’ (the title of Bob Woodward’s book on Greenspan) but there is also an interesting way in which his era contrasts with our own, and the lessons it holds for the future.

First the Greenspan era (1987-2006) was one of building and growing, and accelerated globalization. In general, the 1990’s and 2000’s were periods of rising expectations, whereas today that is not generally the case across countries. A notable feature was the sense that ‘things were on the up’ in the 1990’s was the growth of emerging markets. In contrast, our era is one of vandalization of the institutions that permitted globalization, and in many countries, of a struggle with decline (Britain, Germany and possibly the US are cases in point).

Secondly, the Greenspan period was one where the USA was first amongst equals of nations and this permitted it to play a coordinating role in international economic policy. The most striking image of this came with the February 1999 Time magazine cover that marked the end of the Asian and Russian financial crises with a photo showing Alan Greenspan (Chairman, Federal Reserve), Larry Summers (economic adviser to President Clinton) and Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin, under the banner ‘Committee to Save the World’. That could not happen today. Notably, the Greenspan era was one of collaboration between nations, and also across policy and political bodies (bi-partisanship) in Congress and close coordination between the Fed and the Treasury). Today, growing distrust makes collaboration very difficult, but collaboration is essential to both avoiding and resolving financial crises.

Then, a feature of the 1990’s and 2000’s was the debate around balancing the budget, something that Republicans proclaimed as sacrosanct, but that only Democrat Robert Rubin achieved. In particular, Greenspan was critical of George W Bush for his governments’ lax approach to fiscal matters. At very least then, Treasury Secretaries tried to rein in budget deficits, and generally talked a good game around this. Today, public finances in nearly all the major economies are on cruise-control for fiscal ruin. In the major economies budget deficits register 5% or more, something that would historically be associated with a bad recession. Debt levels, at 100% (to GDP) would have been unthinkable to investors and policy makers in the 1990’s.

If today’s world is an ‘upside down’ version of the 1990’s, then the challenges that Greenspan faced are germane. One risk is that there is a bubble in AI-driven stocks, and the range of market valuation and investor behaviour indicators are tipping levels not seen since 2000 (and 1929!). I can recall a debate in the late 1990’s when the Alan Greenspan Federal Reserve pondered publicly what it should do if there was a bubble in the stock market, the inconclusive outcome of which was that bubbles were very difficult to identify, so it was best to do relatively little, but to then actively mop up the mess once the bubbles burst.

Many central bankers will still agree with this approach, and the context has changed in important ways. The technology behind this bubble is strategic and it is very clear that firms like OpenAI and Palantir are closely aligned with the US government for example. AI is also the principal source of investment led growth, and is thus a sacred economic cow, even though it will swell private sector indebtedness. As such few central bankers may want to puncture this bubble.

This week’s volatile price action in technology stocks (South Korea’s market fell by over 10%) suggest that central bankers should in fact be more vigilant in the face of what Greenspan called ‘irrational exuberance’. He faced the 1987 crash only two months into his tenure. Kevin Warsh, who wants to re-make the Fed a little more in the image of Greenspan, should pay attention.

Have a great week ahead, Mike

A Bit of Reality

The advent of the Kevin Warsh Federal Reserve with its first meeting last Wednesday, very likely heralds a new departure in American central banking. The Warsh Fed will likely be less effusive in its communication (notably there will be less public defending why the Fed doesn’t hit its forecast levels of rates and inflation), will be more closely coordinated with the Treasury, and if the track record of the new governor is to be believed, will be much more reluctant to use the balance sheet of the central bank to support markets and the animal spirits of the economy. The real test of this will be next economic crisis, potentially a public debt crisis that starts in the next couple of years.

In the medium term, the backdrop to the Warsh Fed will likely be characterised by tighter liquidity conditions. Warsh will likely slow the Fed’s reserve accumulation program, equity issuance by tech firms, IPOs, new bond issuance (again, for AI infrastructure) will also mop up market liquidity and following a bout of bond retirement in the second quarter owing to a bumper tax take, the US Treasury will increase debt issuance from the end of June onwards (up to USD 600bn in Q3).

So broadly speaking from a ‘plumbing’ view of markets, there will be less liquidity shooting around the pipelines of markets. Ordinarily, this is not great news for risky assets like equities, especially with valuations at the very top of 100-year ranges. However, the asset class that intrigues me, is bitcoin, already a significant underperformer this year. The mystery being that bitcoin has yet to reveal its true identity as an asset class, let alone a money.

Bitcoin was established in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, as an alternative to paper money and the institutional framework around that money (i.e. the Fed and the ECB), but has failed in this aim. Bitcoin is not a money. It is simply far too volatile to act as a reliable store of value or basis for payment. Also, the technology associated with cryptocurrencies is also complex enough to dissuade most households from using them.

As a case in point, I can recall that in bitcoin’s early days (2016), train stations in Switzerland’s ‘Crypto Valley’ had a facility to exchange swiss francs for bitcoin, and the canton accepted bitcoin as payment for taxes and services. But transaction fees were very high, and this experiment hasn’t caught on. In fact, only some 0.1% of tax settlements in the canton of Zug were paid in bitcoin.

While the Swiss authorities were happy to give bitcoin the benefit of the doubt, most institutions in the old-finance world, primarily central banks who plan their own digital currencies, have an incentive for it not to succeed, and famously in 2021 Christine Lagarde referred to bitcoin’s ‘funny business’.

Reflecting this, the weakness of bitcoin has not been the technology, but rather the infrastructure around it, and the people who have used it as a means of payment. In the past five years, a good number of exchanges (in Asia) and brokers have collapsed or been shut down, and the entry and exit points to the crypto world are under examination from tax authorities. Also the anthropology and sociology of those who populate the crypto world is crucial to how these assets behave and subsequently to their risk characteristics. In this light the, fact that the biggest holder of bitcoins is apparently the FBI says a lot.

Bitcoin, and the broader crypto world, now face two new competitors of sorts. One is the growth of stablecoins (which are based on the Ethereum blockchain), which may facilitate ‘grey’ economy transactions far more efficiently than bitcoin. The other is AI, whose claim on the electricity and energy sources of the world, makes the production of bitcoin more expensive. Lurking in the future is quantum technology, which some fear could break the bitcoin protocol.

So, bitcoin is far away from meeting the objectives of a ‘money’, and in my view is a ‘tulip’, a speculative, trading asset. It also seems to me that many people are increasingly happy with bitcoin being assigned this role, and much of the interest and eco-system that is developing around it underpins the role of bitcoin as a speculative asset rather than as a bona fide currency.

As such, this points to bitcoin and crypto currencies being ushered into the corner of eclectic trading assets – though less of an experience than horse racing, with none of the aesthetic bonus of art and not quite the fun of collecting wine.

These assets tend, in my experience, to be driven by waves of liquidity, and surges in wealth, as opposed to more fundamental factors. Thus, with the prospect of weaker liquidity ahead, bitcoin is in for a test. It has been claimed that bitcoin is a safe haven, or digital gold, but in general its tendency is to weaken as macro uncertainty rises. It might be the first victim of the Warsh era.

Have a great week ahead, Mike

A Very British Coup

Ireland is known for its high-profile actors, from Liam Neeson to Cillian Murphy. But readers might also want to search out the work of actor Ray McAnally, one of Ireland’s best but slightly forgotten actors. Anyone curious to sample his talent should watch the 1992 thee part series ‘A Very British Coup’. It is based on the book of the same name by Chris Mullin, the former Labour MP, Birmingham Six campaigner, and someone who was regarded as one of the most likeable MPs in Westminster. His political diaries are also appreciated as the best in the genre.

‘A Very British Coup’ appeared around the same time as Michael Dobbs’ ‘House of Cards’, which is now famous in its American incarnation, though the British version is far better. In Mullins’ book, the central character is Harry Perkins, a newly elected left wing prime minister from Sheffield, and someone who wears his man of the people identity proudly. As soon as Perkins takes power, he runs up against the establishment, the press, the City, security services and the American government. Despite a valiant resistance, Perkins is eventually forced from power.

The book and tv series came to mind for two reasons, both of which concern next week’s Makerfield by-election on June 18, which could vault Manchester’s mayor Andy Burnham into Downing Street. The resignation of defence secretary John Healey last week ups the ante in this contest.

The first reason is that this manoeuvre is a particularly British one in terms of the logistics of the electoral process and consistent with the tendency in Westminster to discard prime ministers as if they are football managers. No wonder that some commentators refer to the Italianisation of British politics (in the 1990’s the average duration of an Italian government was one year, and we may now be on the brink of the seventh prime minister in ten years). To succeed, Burnham will need a comfortable victory in Makerfield, and a groundswell of support from Labour MP’s.

The second issue relates to the inbox of prospective prime minister Burnham. He is known to be far more political and personable than Starmer, and his mixture of ‘Irish blood and English heart’ (to quote Morrissey) will equip him for the challenges ahead.

Oddly, given the magnitude of change in the world order, some of the challenges that a possible prime minister Burnham will face, are like the ones that confronted Harry Perkins – a gloomy public mood and atmosphere of economic decline, trouble with the Americans and a pressing need to keep up with new technologies.

The special relationship between Washington and London is, like many other institutions of the post Bretton Woods era (NATO, the UN, World Trade Organisation), in real trouble. Senior American politicians like JD Vance and Elon Musk think little of inserting themselves into the debate on immigration and identity in the UK. The NHS is on the verge of cancelling a large contract with Palantir, and the White House has managed to push the UK back towards the EU politically. It has done much the same for Iceland, Norway, Ukraine, Hungary and even Canada.

Then, there is the gloom of the economy. In recent months a series of books has been published about the UK economy, the general tenor of which is captured by AG Hopkins’ ‘The Land Where Nothing Works’. There is a very clear, though frustratingly long-term (for politicians) policy recipe that might allow the UK to lift its sluggish trend growth rate. It involves an overhaul of the education system, far greater state funding of the universities, reform of the welfare state and labour market, and cultivation of broader private investment. Chatter on the left wing of the Labour party suggests that this may not be the chosen path of a Burnham cabinet.

The other related element is technology. In ‘A Very British Coup’, computers were edging into the mainstream, now robots, humanoids and AI are the mainstream. Thanks to the work of a few talented private sector entrepreneurs the UK last year launched its AI Opportunity Plan, which in my view is one of the most coherent strategies for the build-out of a national AI plan.

Last week, the Starmer government followed this with the AI Hardware Plan, which leans heavily on the development of British super computing and next generation semiconductor capabilities. In both cases, Britain has the talent, the vision, but lacks real capital (two months ago the capitalisation of the Taiwanese and South Korean stock markets passed out the FTSE 100), and very markedly, the execution from politicians is missing.

If Andy Burnham becomes prime minister this summer, the risk is that he stops at the political coup of winning power, like the six prime ministers who have preceded him. A real coup would be to restore confidence and momentum in the economy and make Britain a relevant power in the 21^st century.

Have a great week ahead, Mike

Russian Risks Rising

Things must be pretty bad in Russia because a few weeks ago I had an invitation to speak at the St Petersburg Economic Forum. As much as St Petersburg is one of my favourite cities, I will not be going. But, my disdain for Russian politics is almost matched by a curiosity for what is happening to the Russian economy and society.

In the past two months there have been many reports on the emerging weakness in the Russian economy, minor spats of dissent in Russian and the toll that the war is having on demographics – M16 recently released an estimate of over 500,000 deaths of Russian soldiers in the war on Ukraine so far (for context Russia suffered 450,000 deaths from combat/starvation/disease in the Crimean War and 15,000 in the 1980’s Afghan campaign), with a monthly casualty rate approaching 35,000.

As a result, the unemployment rate is close to 2%, labour shortages prevail and the growth of the economy is stalling out. Russia’s economy is now largely a war economy, defence spending is 8% of GDP but many private and state resources have effectively been co-opted to bolster the war effort. Cracks are starting to show. The budget deficit is widening despite high oil prices, shortages of goods are more noticeable I am told, and banking and taxi apps frequently don’t function.

While there are some reports of dissent amongst the Moscow elite, broad discontent is not visible, and nor should people expect to this this until things turn very bad. One memory I have is on morning runs through Moscow, passing the heaped flowers marking the spot where Boris Nemtsov, a Moscow insider but Putin rival, had been gunned down on the bridge that passes the Kremlin in a not too subtle message to anyone who thinks Vladimir Putin is not the only solution to Russia’s problems.

Putin’s predatory style is also evident across Europe in act of political manipulation (e.g. Nathan Gill the former leader of the Reform party in Wales was sentenced to 10 years in prison for taking bribes to make pro-Russia statements), sabotage and grey-zone hostile actions which we have written about in previous notes (‘Shadow Wars’ and ‘From Great War to Total War’). Europe is slowly adapting to this and there is less naivety and tolerance for Russia’s actions, amidst warnings from intelligence services of a potential conflict with Russia in the next three years.

The very striking development is how Russia’s attack on Ukraine has changed the strategic landscape around Russia. Previously neutral states, Finland and Sweden, have joined NATO and there is now a rush to increase defence spending and capabilities across the Nordic and Baltic states, not to mention Poland. Hungarians voted to jettison Viktor Orban, a friend of the Kremlin, and Hungary’s new prime minister is restoring its place as a country that other EU members can have faith in, and notably repairing relations with Ukraine. Ukraine and Moldova are now on the (slow) path to join the EU, and within the Union, defence spending, manufacturing and innovation are picking up.

It is also worth noting that Russia’s relationship with China is changing, with Moscow now very much the weaker party, and increasingly beholden to Beijing. It might well be that China is the actor to bring forward a solution to the war in Ukraine, and thereby extricate Russia from its bloody, strategic mistake.

While there is no sign yet of an economic tipping point in Russia, nor more so of a political one, the sense is that the strain is mounting, and the odds of a ‘Russia’ crisis are slowly rising. This might manifest itself within Russia, or its security state, or could express itself in a tail-risk attack on a European country. Drone incursions into Lithuania and Romania have already heightened tensions.

In terms of the Russian economy, I recall, as a young economist, attending a faculty seminar with Stanley Fischer in 1999, when (as one of the IMF chiefs) he described the urgency behind the IMF bailout of Russia, which was partly motivated by risks posed by Russia’s nuclear arsenal and the need for stability. Stability took some time to arrive and when it did, came in the form of Vladimir Putin (Catherine Belton’s book ‘Putin’s People’ is very good here).

Compared to 1998, the Russian economy is structurally much changed, but vastly behind the potential levels it might have reached. Remarkably, it is a competitive laggard in key hard technologies from semiconductors to AI, and less so in quantum computing. To that extent Putin has robbed his country of an economic future, and the consequences of his war are rising.

As I write the Ukrainian army has marked the beginning of the St Petersburg Forum with drone strikes on the city.

Have a great week ahead, Mike

AI as an asset class

A very early career memory of mine came in late 1999 when the UBS investment bank took the team of analysts covering the staid Paper & Packaging team and re-directed them to become the ‘dot.com’ team. This I reckon came about six months before the peak of the ‘dot.com’ bubble and, I am now wondering if investment banks are channeling resources into AI banking teams (surely AI can do the work!). If so, it would be proof of the idea that AI is everywhere, from the Mythos breakthrough we wrote about a few weeks ago to, with good timing the thoughtful note, Magnifica Humanitas, from Pope Leo XIV on how AI should be deployed.

Nowhere is the sense that AI is everywhere more true than in finance. According to Pitchbook, 45% of all American unicorns (venture-backed companies with a valuation above USD 1bn) are AI-driven, not bad for a technology that, to public eyes, barely existed three years ago. In more detail, two earlier venture-backed successes, Bytedance (i.e. TikTok) and Uber had been established for 80 months when they launched their first products. OpenAI and Anthropic have done so after 30 months, and each is now worth close to USD 1 trn. Equally, illustrating the link between investor exuberance and AI, the FT recently estimated that two-thirds of the value of SpaceX is attributable to investments made in the company in the six months since December 2025.

When this trio of AI firms lists on the stock market, revised index inclusion rules will add their weight to the already substantial 44% representation of technology stocks in the major indices. To that end, AI is no longer a market theme or fad, but is becoming an asset class in its own right.

One of the factors that distinguishes a genuine asset class from a market theme or fad is the presence of a transformative technology, with a lasting economic impact. In the context of an otherwise pedestrian US economy, AI capital expenditure is the dominant growth driver and in the last year, expenditure on data centres in the US hit USD 1 trillion.

A comprehensive study from Stanford’s Forecasting Research Institute (March 2026) compared GDP forecasts from different types of forecasters – economists in the private sector, academics, AI experts and the general public. Unsurprisingly, those closest to the AI industry tended to have the highest GDP forecasts, while academics were more grounded. On balance though, there is a consensus view that AI will lift the trend rate of growth in the US.

There are also increasingly varied ways to invest in AI. An AI-centric portfolio can now span private equity, venture capital, infrastructure (clean energy for data centres), real estate (data centres), currencies such as the Korean won, corporate bonds (Amazon, Meta, Oracle and Alphabet have issued nearly USD 150bn in bonds this year) and private credit. Indeed, AI-related private credit investments are expected to grow by over USD 1.5 trn in the next two years. While there is already a rich mix of AI-centric asset classes, the correlations between them remain high, limiting the diversification benefit.

In addition to investment banks committing resource to AI-driven deals, another hint that AI is an emerging asset class is that it has its own distinctive mode of corporate governance – strong-willed founders who monopolise voting rights, enormous pay packets and neutered boards. This concentration of control is likely to prove one of the structural vulnerabilities of the AI complex as scrutiny from regulators and institutional investors intensifies.

Given the scale of AI’s footprint across markets, one of the essential tasks for investors will be to identify assets uncorrelated with AI (e.g. luxury goods, food), as well as hedges on AI assets. And, as the suspected AI bubble grows in value, investment managers will have to find ways of protecting portfolios against sharp reversals in AI valuations.

The investment dimension of the AI boom carries particular urgency. Given the risk that AI (as per Mythos) creates potentially existential security and economic risks, and could disrupt labour markets, there is a strategic need for pension funds and sovereign wealth funds to have exposure to the economic benefits of AI. As it stands, the risk is that billions of people will have their lives and livelihoods changed by AI, but the benefits accrue to only a narrow group of investors and executives. In that regard, the advent of AI as an asset class gives individuals, countries and investment funds a means of participating in the upside of the AI boom.

The one formidable obstacle investors will have to navigate is the sense that we are in the thick of an AI bubble. Already long-run valuation measures – such as the ratio of market price to long-run earnings (the ‘Shiller P/E’), or the ratio of the value of the US stock market to GDP – are testing all-time highs, at levels not seen since 1929 and 2000. In this way, AI is truly everywhere, in our savings, investments and pensions, and that will be a risk.

To return to my first point on the switching of analyst roles. A couple of brokerages have, according to the Wall Street Journal’s China correspondent, dropped coverage of Chinese consumer stocks because of the weak outlook for spending. It might be the next trend to watch.

Have a great week ahead, Mike