Friends

An important sign that globalization is over and that America’s role as the keystone of the world order is crumbling is the flux in strategic alliances between countries, across multiple regions. Arguably there has not been a period of such furtive strategic alliance formation since before the Cold War. Globalization was a geopolitical anomaly in the sense that there were no major wars, international norms, rules of geopolitical behaviour and institutions were respected. This is certainly not the case today, and the idea of ‘fracturing’ we wrote about in 2020 is accelerating.

Sweden and Finland reacted to the invasion of Ukraine by joining NATO. Next week (29^th) Iceland will vote to recommence membership negotiations with the EU and potentially join Moldova and Ukraine in the accession queue. Iceland had toyed with membership in the aftermath of the global financial crisis and the consensus in the small country is once again turning to Europe, because of ‘geopolitics’, by which Icelanders mean the presence of Russia in the Arctic and greater Nordic region, and American threats to ‘take’ Greeenland.

The Iran War will eventually provoke a re-alignment of alliances across the region, where the crucial variable is the relationship between the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Two weeks ago, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey signed a joint defense pact in Mecca, an accord that has strategic implications for Iran, Israel and notably, India. During the period of globalization, Turkish foreign policy was conditioned by the maxim ‘no trouble with neighbours’. Now, Turkey is involved in some form, in every skirmish in the region – from Libya, to Syria, to Azerbaijan to Iraq.

Then in Asia, relatively new ‘clubs’ have been forming; AUKUS (effectively a US – Australia alliance), the Quad (Japan, the US, India and Australia) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (China, Russia and Pakistan are the main members). For their part, South Korea, Japan and Taiwan, all formal allies of the US, will be worried by the gradual strategic distance that the White House is putting between its Asian allies, the most recent is the curtailing of joint military training exercises between American and South Korean forces.

Most of these alliances are motivated by a common factor; an America that is more singular, and less willing to be the world’s policeman. This change is complicated by the fact that the White House appears to have a fascination for autocrats (for example, Steve Witkoff, President Trump’s peace emissary has not visited Ukraine, but is a frequent visitor to Moscow). Indeed, some of the critics of the White House’s foreign policy stance, such as Harvard academic Stephen Walt, go a step further and have referred to the US as a ‘predatory hegemon’.

The net effect is that many countries will now experience the loss of the ‘policeman premium’ they enjoyed when America underwrote their defence, and instead will have to pay a ‘predator premium’; the higher security and defence costs associated with a more adversarial geopolitical climate. Germany is the case in point, where military spending and combat readiness had dwindled during the period of globalizations, but where it has now lifted its debt brake and will spend up to Eur 1 trillion on defence in the coming ten years. Corporates are also facing this defence friction – either through supply chain disruption, cyber-attacks or the theft of corporate secrets to the extent that corporate intelligence is a fast-growing field (Lewis Sage-Passant’s book ‘Beyond States and Spies’ is a very good text here).

The kaleidoscopic shift in alliances will likely continue, and a cautionary tale is the manner in which the tangled web of alliances that sprung up during the first wave of globalization (1870-1913) tripped itself up. Then Europe was split between the Triple Alliance (Germany, Italy and Austria/Hungary) and the Triple Entente (Britain, France and Russia). Margaret MacMillan’s books on the First World War (for example ‘The War That Ended Peace’) are worth a read and the parallel in the arms race between Britain and Germany then, and China and the US now, is striking.

Alarmists might worry that a ‘great power’ war is close, but the only saving grace from the wars in Iran and Ukraine, is that the great military powers struggle to achieve their aims in the face of new technologies and tactics. Let’s hope they learn these lessons.

Have a great week ahead, Mike

Is China OK?

China's economy grows at one of lowest rates in decades

For much of the last decade or so, Chinese friends and acquaintances, as well as many people I know in Singapore and Hong Kong, have remarked that their view of Europeans is a lazy and decadent people, too tolerant of the problems that beset their societies. This view is in part gentle mockery, and part sincere. Europeans, not used to being mocked, will look up from their Aperol spritz and ask what they are doing wrong?

Indeed, according to the latest (and fourth) University of Alberta ‘How China sees the World’ survey, it seems that most Chinese don’t rate the EU as a major geopolitical player, though a significant economic partner and more importantly, a tourism destination.

The survey highlights that the Chinese have a strong view of their country’s importance on the international stage, pitting it ahead of the USA in a bi-polar world order. The interesting elements in the survey are the casting of Russia as an indispensable, trusted partner on the international stage for China, and the confidence with which participants gauge a war with Japan as a likely geopolitical event.

To an extent, it is welcome to consider Chinese views on the rest of the world, granted the irony that for such an important economic and geopolitical player, there are relatively so few Western experts on China, and in Western public discourse there is not a well-developed conversation on Chinese culture and politics. Consider that there are very few Irish public figures who know China well, and the evolution of China’s economy does not get enough detailed attention in the Irish media, despite China’s enormous role in the world economy.

This might be because China makes it increasingly difficult for outsiders to understand it. In the past seven years, Western investment in China has dropped significantly, and the flow of Westerners to work in China has also fallen. A further illustration is that there are now fewer than 2000 Americans studying in China according to the Straits Times (down from 11,000 in 2019) while there are still some 250,000 Chinese studying in the US (down from 354,000 in 2019), and a further 150,000 Chinese studying in the UK (and close to 4,000 in Ireland).

The reduced social, political and commercial connection between China and the West makes it harder to read what is happening to the Chinese economy, with the additional concern that official Chinese data is not helpful either. Granted that China last week printed one of its lowest official GDP growth readings, this is a significant hurdle. Indeed, there is a sense amongst many Western economists that only an amalgam of very detailed, micro indicators (e.g. electricity usage) can help build a picture of what is really happening in the Chinese economy.

For example, In the USA, the Conference Board has reconstructed China’s economic data, and has concluded that not only has the performance of the Chinese economy overestimated, but it has been driven by the flow of huge amounts of capital into the economy that has steadily become less productive (in the sense that one dollar of capital leads to a decreasingly small return). It may be that the Conference Board team has gotten it wrong, but there is simply neither the forum nor the spirit for an open debate on Chinese data. Also, a prominent Chinese economist Gao Shanwen, who died of cancer last month, had stated publicly that the trend rate of growth in China is far lower than official figures suggest.

Despite that, the most interesting element is that the Chinese authorities have managed their economy better than most have thought, and to use a headline from the New York Times, China’s economy ‘has failed to fail’ in the sense that it has not had an obvious cyclical recession in decades.

If there is a strategy behind this, it looks from afar, as the state pushing activity from one economic engine to another. The Chinese property market has steadily deflated over the past six years, and the financial consequences of this have in my view not fully registered with banks and households. At the same time, through a mixture of state guidance and ruthless industrial competition, China has shifted the locus of activity to manufacturing (and the last Plenum, policy making forum, has ordained deep tech as the spearhead of the Chinese economic effort).

One consequence has been the creation of over-capacity, but in goods of sufficient quality and low production cost, that they displace European markets. Last week, exports of Chinese cars to Europe have just topped a monthly tally of 1 million, while European manufacturers (even Porsche) are struggling in China. The result is a crisis of confidence in German manufacturing, and a policy debate on how to curb the flow of Chinese exports into Europe.

In the past year, China has pursued an ‘involution’ policy, of reducing spare capacity across a range of industries, but this does not yet appear to have borne fruit and raises the risk that there is still a lot of operational leverage in the economy. Two other risks loom. One consequence of the funding of real estate and manufacturing through the banking sector is that in terms of assets, China’s banks are amongst the largest in the world, a systematic risk in the event of a downturn, and its public (including local and regional authority) debt, is dangerously high.

With trading partners, such as Germany, beginning to react to China’s export boom, the policy options for Beijing are increasingly limited as they try to maintain economic momentum. Another bad GDP print and investors will start to fear the worst.

Have a great week ahead, Mike

Constellations

One of the highly unique, and fascinating characteristics of this era of unravelling is the way we increasingly look at the world from a geopolitical rather than a geographic point of view. In previous phases in history, geography and geopolitics aligned neatly – for example the democratic West faced off against the communist East while economically, the North was well ahead of the South. Now, select countries from disparate parts of the world share the same dilemmas and challenges. Japan, as a middle power, arguably has more in common geopolitically with the UK, than it does with Indonesia. In turn, Singapore and Ireland, arguably share the same geopolitical stress points.

In the post globalized world, new coalitions and constellations of countries are beginning to emerge. That much was on display at Davos two weeks ago, when Canadian prime minister Mark Carney eloquently pleaded the case of the democratic ‘middle powers’ and the need for them to collaborate. His speech was followed by the far less eloquent launch of Donald Trump’s ‘Board of Peace’, which is a ragtag band of largely developing countries not known for their commitment to the rule of law and appreciation of human rights.

As the various threads of globalization – from the use of the SWIFT payment system to energy pipelines like Nord Stream, the ‘special relationship’ between the UK and the US, NATO, USAID, and many more, fall by the wayside, new groups and alignments emerge, and in the rest of this note I will sketch some of them.

To start at the top of the pyramid, regular readers will know that David Skilling and I have extensively researched the phenomenon of small, advanced economies – a group that spans Sweden, Singapore, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Ireland, Belgium, Norway, Finland, Switzerland, Austria and Denmark, and that may in future incorporate the Gulf States.

Culturally, these countries are very different but share the same economic and social successes (‘happiest place to live’, ‘best rule of law’, ‘highest GDP’), and a common policy recipe that is based on innovation, openness, education and social cohesion. While we have even tried to create a policy forum for these countries (the ‘g20’), they do not act as a formal block, but actively compare notes behind the scenes. For example, the Nordic states are learning from each other and collaborating on immigration, while Ireland urgently needs to follow the examples of Singapore and Norway on defence.

Then, below the small, advanced economies are the ‘middle powers’, sizeable, developed countries, many of whom enjoyed periods of international dominance, but are now beset by demographic issues (ageing and immigration), and are searching for a defined geopolitical role. Japan, the UK, Canada, Korea, Australia and Russia (not big enough economically to be a superpower, and not nice enough either). With the exception of Russia, the middle powers are democracies and most are eager that the world stays much the same as it was during the period of globalization (at least in the case of Keir Starmer). As such they are beginning to hedge bets by aligning with larger powers, Russia with China, and the UK is now cultivating much better relations with the EU.

Looming over the middle powers are the three ‘great powers’ – China, the US and the EU, each with their strengths – military, finance and technology for the US, culture, liberal democracy, well-being and cities in the case of Europe, and industry and cultural cohesion in the case of China.

They will be the pillars of the emerging multipolar world, and in contrast to the globalized era where most countries adopted the American way of doing things, these three ‘blocs’ will increasingly do things their own, culturally specific way. AI is an example, but corporate governance might be another tack. In addition to these three behemoths, a ‘Fourth Pole’ made up of a core of India and the Gulf states, is possible, as we wrote back in November.

Those classifications still leave about fifty percent of the world’s population unaccounted for, whose nations collectively labour under the term ‘Global South’. These countries, from Nigeria to Indonesia to Bangladesh, share similar policy problems – the building of e-commerce driven economies, healthcare and urbanisation, to name a few but they are not at all at the level of policy exchange as the small, advanced economies, and many of them do not have structured economic models.

For some, the idea of the ‘Fourth Pole’ can become an interesting organizing point, but to a very large extent the survival of existing world institutions, from the UN to the World Bank, now depends on the large, populous emerging economies. Equally, the directions that these countries take in their political economy – do they follow the ‘Chinese model’, the European democratic one, or something else altogether. This policy question is vastly underestimated in the discourse on international economics and politics, partly because the ‘great powers’ are not leading by example.

Have a great week ahead, Mike

Coherence

Kim Hong-Kyun is not a name that very many Europeans know, but they really should, given his grave diplomatic intervention last week. Hong-Kyun is the South Korean ‘first foreign minister’, who last week summoned the Russian ambassador to Seoul to register South Korea’s displeasure at the news that up to 12,000 North Korean soldiers are in or on their way to Russia to fight in Ukraine.

While North Korea’s contribution to the Russian war effort is already known (their armaments industry is producing as many shells as Russia itself – and more than all of Europe), the prospect of an Asian state sending soldiers to fight in a European country is unprecedented, and I am perplexed that European governments have not reacted to this (though South Korea, Australia and Japan sent representatives to a recent NATO meeting).

The South Koreans have pledged to arm Ukraine if North Korean troops fight there, raising the complicated prospect of an Asian proxy war in Europe – again something that would have been inconceivable years ago, and that also tilts us towards the notion of a world war.

Whilst some readers might find this an exaggeration, we are at a moment of coherence, when threads that have been developing over the years become clearer and begin to describe the contours of the emerging geopolitical order.

One of the notable formations here is the SCO or Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, which I wrote about in the Levelling (p. 245) describing them as a geopolitical ‘gang’ of the future and sort of anti-NATO coalition, or at least an anti-AUKUS group. Despite this, few of the university post-grads in international relations I have come across in recent teaching sessions knew of the SCO.

There is a sense that the shadow or the logic of the SCO was lurking behind last week’s BRICS meeting, given the perception that the BRICS is becoming an anti-Western alliance, which in reality is not true. Reinforcing this are the very different cultures across the BRICS countries, and the risk to their project that relations between them depend on individual autocrats rather than institutions or peoples.

Yet, a sign of the times is the manner in which large emerging nations like India and Turkey are hedging their bets in the sense of maintaining good relations with Russia and the US. For India in particular, the BRICS meeting was a chance to begin to repair relations with China.

They could be forgiven for doing so granted the impact that the outcome of the US presidential election will have on international relations. The choice is one between an effective continuation of the foreign policy of the Biden/Democrat administration in the context of growing pushback against American power, versus a Trump foreign policy that is unsure, opportunistic and likely goes against the deep grain of Republican foreign policy as established by Ronald Reagan, George H Bush, Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice.

2025 will hopefully see the end of wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, following which the notion of the coherence of rival systems will come into sharper focus. It is increasingly clear that the leading autocratic states (Russia and China) are hell bent on undermining the democratic world, and any nations that toy with the idea of joining it (witness the heavy handed Russian interference in last week’s referendum on EU membership in Moldova, and it’s obvious interference in Georgia’s election which takes place this weekend).

The danger is that the sharpening coherence of the SCO is like the development of AI – it has been gathering pace amongst specialists for some time, and then a public event (the launch of ChatGPT) brings it into the public domain.

One of the obvious casualties of the emergence of the SCO and indeed the geopolitical trials the world is suffering, is the diminished influence and credibility of world institutions like the UN and WTO (World Trade Organisation), which are being reduced to the role of bystanders in this emerging geopolitical contest.

The scene is set then for the November 5^th election to either reinforce or undermine the world order.

Have a great week ahead, Mike