Taking sides in the fight for democracy

Last week was a busy one, two days in Copenhagen for the excellent Fund Forum, then through Dublin on Wednesday to present ‘Opportunities and Challenges for a small, advanced economy’ at the Irish state’s ‘National Economic Dialogue’ and finally to London for the UK launch of ‘The Levelling’. Appearances on CNBC, Sky and a lecture at the London School of Economics were amongst the highlights.

In other media one input I would like to flag is a feature in The Economist (https://www.economist.com/open-future/2019/06/28/globalisation-is-dead-and-we-need-to-invent-a-new-world-order). The interview reflected a question that I get on a recurring basis which is how we ‘lost globalization’?

There are several strands to the response here. First, globalization has been a force for good but is now receding, trade flows are the most obvious example. Second, as globalization retreats we become more aware of its perceived side effects, such as inequality, the changes in our lifestyles and our diets, and generally “the way we live now,” to borrow Anthony Trollope’s words. Relatedly, the aftermath of the global financial crisis and the responses to it have left a range of im- balances in place.

Third, people are now reacting to these imbalances and side effects. This is manifest in growing political volatility, which in my view will bring about a revolution in politics as people search for more accountable and responsible forms of governance, rather than less democratic forms of government.

As it stands, many people like blame the ills of specific countries at the door of globalization. Radical political leaders—such as Nigel Farage, formerly of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP); Marine Le Pen, formerly of France’s National Front; and the Five Star Movement in Italy—and media pundits like Sean Hannity of Fox News have spoken out loudly against globalization. The notion that everything is the fault of globalization is very convenient. It makes for an expedient culprit, and it is so pervasive that we have lost sight of its meaning and implications.

Globalization has few defenders, as it is now unfashionable and po- litically unprofitable to show support for it. It has no outright owner, though some international research bodies and thought leaders like the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the World Economic Forum (WEF) are closely associated with it.

Similarly, many economic, political, and social stresses, such as inequality, poverty, and the decline of agriculture, are ascribed to the evils of globalization, regardless of the true origins of those stresses (in fact, during globalization the world poverty level has collapsed from 35 percent of the world population in 1990 to 11 percent in 2013). In addition, the public understanding of globalization is not strong.

Understandably, few people take the trouble to sift through trade reports or examine the flow of labor around the world. Thus, as with the issue of “Europe” in British politics, where few politicians have said or can say anything positive about Europe, globalization is vulnerable to becoming a catchall for the negative aspects of economic growth and so functions as a sort of political doormat.

There is, however, a strong case to be made that globalization, the most powerful economic force the world has witnessed in the past twenty years, has been a force for good. It is now so pervasive in its effects and has produced so many startling outcomes—for example, the rise of Dubai, the successes of small states like Singapore, growing wealth in emerging economies (from 2000 to 2010 wealth per adult in Indonesia increased sixfold), the emerging-market consumer, and fast-changing consumer tastes—that we risk taking it for granted.

With the G20 meeting in Osaka now over, there was not in my view sufficient urgency on the demise of globalization and what might take its place.

In particular, the Russian leader’s comments that liberalism is obsolete opens up a new avenue of attack in the debate on globalization, and one that will delight Mr Putin’s admirers. His remarks which I feel are just a demonstration of ‘maskirovka’ (the Russian military doctrine that is centred around deceiving and destabilizing opponents). That the American President did not upbraid Putin is striking, but not surprising. It teaches us that the idea of liberal democracy needs to be defended, and its benefits more clearly elucidated.

Hong Kong, Latin America and Eastern Europe are the battlegrounds here, and ongoing contests between ‘liberal’ and ‘managed’ versions of democracy in countries like the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland help to uncover the motivation for Mr Putin’s remarks.

The immediate challenge here is for the new leader of the EU, whomever he or she is, to take up the case for liberal democracy. In my view, this is a core value of the EU and it is high time that countries who wilfully slip towards corrupt and mendacious approaches to governance should be asked to take sides.

Have a great week ahead,

Mike

Charlie Chaplin and the Japanese bond market

The future all over again – satire and dictatorship

On May 15 1932 there was an attempted coup d’etat in Japan, led by a militant, nationalistic faction in the Imperial Army. The principal victim was the Japanese Prime Minister, Inukai Tsuyoshi. The perpetrators of the coup were given relatively light prison sentences, a pointer to the less democratic and belligerent Japan that would soon follow.

The bizarre element of the coup, which fortunately did not succeed was a plan to murder the actor Charlie Chaplin. The thinking was that such a deed would incite popular fury in the US, and thus lead to war, in which Japan would prevail. At the time of the coup Chaplin was watching a sumo wrestling match with the Prime Minister’s son, and thereby escaped the assassins.

This was more than lucky and in many ways Chaplin’s film The Great Dictator is a fine riposte to the destructive nationalism and totalitarianism that took hold across the world from the mid 1930’s. It is a film that still resonates today.

The view that this incident presents of Japan is also interesting. At the time, economically at least Japan was still an emerging market. Indeed the poor performance of the Japanese stock market around the second world war period is responsible for the historic muted performance of emerging markets relative to developed over the past seventy years.

While our view of Japan today is of a placid country, its history in the past two centuries is a reminder of the pitfalls of isolationism, nationalism and war – concerns that are now echoing louder across the international political economy debate. It should be said at the same time that that the post second world war relationship between the US and Japan is a good example of how two feuding countries can come together (Al Alletzhauser’s ‘House of Nomura’ is good on this topic).

That relationship is pivotal today for a number of reasons. First, a series of military equipment purchases by Japan, mostly notably of over 100 F-35 stealth fighters, manifestly aligns it as America’s fulcrum in Asia and unambiguously points to a change in its defence doctrine.

Second, as the world’s third largest economy, and a cyclical one at that, Japan is a large cog in the trade dispute between the US and China. There was a time when America feared the rise of Japan as it now does China, and any fans of economic history may know that during the 1980’s and 1990’s Donald Trump was an eminent Japan-trade basher. For those of you who want a market scare, the April 13 1987 cover of Time magazine carried an image of Uncle Sam pitted against a sumo wrestler under the banner ‘Trade Wars – the US gets tough with Japan’. The stock market crashed five months later. Does history teach us anything?

Japan may profit strategically from the curbing of China by America, though economically it will suffer from the diminution in world trade and through the side-effects of a stronger yen. In that respect, this weekend’s G20 finance minister’s meeting, lead by Taro Aso, is important as it offers an opportunity to begin to mend relations between the US and China. If this does not happen, then Japan’s bond market offers up a vision of what a trade damaged financial landscape may look like.

Last week, Japanese two year bond yields dipped towards minus 20 basis points, very close to the lows of the last decade. That German and many other euro-zone bond yields are at similarly low levels (indeed globally 11 USD trillion worth of bonds trades with negative yields) will encourage many commentators to suggest that Europe is the next Japan. In this respect if bond yields are a forecast of future growth, this is not an optimistic view.

Here, one of the central tenets of The Levelling is that there is too much debt in the global financial system, and that too little is being done about it. Quantitative easing makes this worse by diminishing the urgency which with indebtedness should be tackled and creating the circumstances where economic actors feel that they can take on even more debt. In many cases, Japan being one, debt clogs and distorts the economic system, and until it is paid back or restructured, economic growth in indebted countries (most of the world) will remain sluggish. Its all enough to make me think of Charlie Chaplin’s depression era film Modern Times.

Have a great week ahead,

Mike

Secrets of leadership – vision and ‘glue’

The Levelling is published on this coming Tuesday (in the US). As an author who has to sell books, I should perhaps say that differently, something like ‘Globalization is dead, the Levelling is coming’.

In the very last part of the book I wrote that I finished the final edits whilst on holiday in Corsica, and that I had noted that such was the volatile state of world affairs, that I wished nothing too dramatic would happen until the book was published lest it upset the thesis of The Levelling.

What is strange is that while the last seven months have been very volatile in terms of financial market action and economic performance, relatively little has occurred in terms of what Harold Wilson called ‘events’. The one traumatic, unexpected event I witnessed during that time was the fire in Notre Dame, while the event that has yet to happen, is Brexit.

Elsewhere, President Trump has been busy prosecuting the end of the American century and the beginnings of a multipolar world, and unbeknownst to him, the onset of the ‘Levelling’. His actions have sidelined the institutions of the 20th century, many of whom are defunct. He is squandering American soft power at a moment when it arguably most needs it – in Latin America for instance, and he is vandalizing the wiring of the global economy.

Here, when economists and commentators address the issue of the trade war, they tend to focus on high level indicators such as the impact of tariffs on growth and inflation. What will be far more telling, but not yet obvious are the disruptive changes that tariffs and tough trade rhetoric do to corporate supply chains and to investment plans. There are already signs that corporate spending across Asia and the US is dropping, and we should expect that in many cases cross border investment flows will slow.

Arguably, uncertainty for corporates might be lower were there a vision for a post trade war international economic order. None exists, not in the White House and not in bodies like the World Trade Organisation (WTO). If anything, the White House is reacting against the vision offered by the concept of the Chinese Dream or Made in China 2025.

The notion that vision is important, leads me, by a tangent to the question of leadership. There are thousands of books on the topic – from the points of view of management studies, military experts, sports people and so on. Many writers have poured forth on the secret sauce of leadership, on ingredient of which must be ‘vision’ or more aptly the ‘vision thing’ as. Ronald Reagan had it in a very broad sense, George H Bush mulled what he called ‘the vision thing’ and Bill Clinton worked hard to enunciate his vision. Theresa May had none.

The reason that leadership is on my mind is that once the dust clears on the European Parliamentary elections, the haggling over the runners and riders in the next EU executive will take place. Here the most notable change will not be the entry of any particular character, but the exit of Mario Draghi from the European Central Bank. Europe and the euro-zone will and should miss him.

It is my personal view that Draghi is perhaps the only true European leader of recent years. He has had vision – and has demonstrated another key quality of leadership – that of binding people together in difficult circumstances. At a time when the shortcomings of the euro-zone system were laid bare, and there was a risk that the entire apparatus might pull asunder, his political skills acted as a glue to hold it together.

In the style of much of the leadership literature, Mr Draghi’s leadership skills are probably transferable to other domains – he might as easily take the reins at Barcelona FC or Juventus. It may well be more fun than becoming the next Italian Prime Minister or President. For its part, the EU will have to replace the Draghi ‘glue’ with an overhaul of the machinery of the euro-zone system.

Finally, again, in contrast Theresa May had no leadership ‘glue’ with which to bind the many factions in the Tory Party together. My sense is that whomever succeeds her, will need that ‘glue’ to help colleagues accept the reality of the Brexit deal on offer from the EU, and to face into the challenge of piloting Britain’s new, lonely furrow in world affairs.

Have a great week ahead

Mike

From the Banquet at Hongmen to Hong Kong

…as I was saying…regular readers of the Sunday letter will know that I have taken a break from it in recent weeks to recast the note around my forthcoming book ‘The Levelling’, and I hope that some will be happy it is back.

For those of you who are new to my list (please let me know if I should not have you on the list, or if you have colleagues or friends who would like to join it) I will send out a letter each Sunday morning (the one time people have a chance to read something) that mixes history, politics, markets, geopolitics and economics.

Given the intersection of these factors a good place to start this week is the Banquet at Hongmen, which occurred in China in 206 BC. In an age that is in Game of Thrones overdrive the story of Hongmen will appeal to many (indeed there is already a film about it called White Vengeance (2012)). In China, the tale is short-hand for duplicity and assassination and it featured in the Chinese press last week as part of the more popular response to President Trump’s tariff increase on China.

As an anchor point, ‘Hongmen’ serves a number of purposes that of course effortlessly dovetail into the themes of The Levelling. The first is that internal politics matter – Hongmen occurred at a time when the Qin and Han dynasties were contesting power. In this regard, for all that we hear today about the 2020 Presidential election campaign, we hear equally little about political debate within the Communist Party on topics like trade and relations with the USA.

Second, the cycles of the rise and fall of nations matter a lot. China has had many such cycles and America has effectively to complete a full cycle. Some may feel that this comes across in the bravoura of America’s interaction with other countries, but we should also bear in mind the context and patience that China’s history affords its leadership.

A third related point here is that China’s long history has given it a deep culture and sense of civilization. This is lost on some. Kiron Skinner a State Department official has recently tried to cast US-China relations as a ‘Clash of Civilisations’.  This is a lazy use of Samuel Huntington’s work. A better parsing of the situation is multipolarity, where the world moves away from globalization towards a system driven by three large regions (US, EU and China) who do things in distinctly different ways.

In this context, the trade dispute is a marker of China’s rise and the belated realization of America’s elite as to how it should curb this. Tariffs are not at all the apt tool. There are better avenues. For example, America is extremely powerful financially, in terms of the usage of the dollar, depth and centrality of its markets and the power of its banks. Indeed, one could argue that the US is more hegemonic in finance than it is militarily.

Another avenue is leadership in international rules and standards. Many new fields such as artificial intelligence, genetic editing and cyber war have grown so quickly that they have bypassed international laws, philosophies and norms regarding them. One challenge for the US is to take the lead in outlining new standards and laws in these areas. Unfortunately this is something it does not appear prepared to do, especially in areas like climate change. If anything the US is ceding soft power to China.

To jump to finance, the market view of the trade dispute is that some form of resolution will be forthcoming. The drop in volatility on Friday suggested that US markets are moving from being positioned for a risky outcome, to one that is more sanguine. Other Asia centric ones like the KOSPI index South Korea and the Australian dollar will need to strengthen in order to give the all clear.

If a trade deal is struck, it will mark the beginning of a formal rivalry between the US and China, the start of more ‘nation first’ patterns in consumption and corporate investment and the end of bodies like the World Trade Organisation. There may be many more flash points.

Here, many tend to focus on great naval battles of the future in the South China Sea. In my view, one looming touchpoint is Hong Kong, where there is a fierce debate ongoing around a proposal to permit the imprisonment in China of those sentenced by courts in Hong Kong. For a city-state with a very expensive housing market, dollar currency peg and large stock market, this may be one area where geopolitics again ripples through markets.  

Have a great week ahead,

Mike