Un train peut cacher un autre

Adam Smith, though better known now as an economist held the chair of Moral Philosophy at Glasgow and as such it’s fair to assume that he knew a thing or two about the intersection of economics, philosophy and politics, and that often a political crisis is motivated by an underlying economic crisis…hence the title of this note.

Smith lived during a time of mercantilism, which we might describe as a nationalistic approach to trade that aims to maximise the exports of a country whilst keeping imports to a minimum. In this context, Smith wrote of mercantilist nations that ‘their interest lies in beggaring their neighbours’, and the phrase ‘beggar thy neighbour’ has been often used in the economic context, usually when growth is scarce (the aftermath of the Great Depression and the Global Financial crisis)

With mercantilism and ‘beggar thy neighbour’ back in fashion, it is worth returning to Smith’s ‘Wealth of Nations, book IV’ where many of the observations Smith made chime with America today, such as:

‘The sneaking arts of underling tradesmen are thus erected into political maxims for the conduct of a great empire … . By such maxims as these, however, nations have been taught that their interest consisted in beggaring all their neighbours. Each nation has been made to look with an invidious eye upon the prosperity of all the nations with which it trades, and to consider their gain as its own loss. Commerce, which ought naturally to be, among nations, as among individuals, a bond of union and friendship, has become the most fertile source of discord and animosity’.

To that end, beyond the bonfire of American values and diplomatic relationships, there is an emerging, underlying logic to the policies of the White House that China, Japan and Europe need to pay attention to.

I have written many times in this note that the world economy is in the antechamber of a fiscal-debt crisis (listen to ‘Waking up to World Debt’). Unusually, all of the major economies have become indebted at the same time, and the process(es) by which they try to reduce debt at the same time will likely prove extremely hazardous financially.

It seems that the Trump entourage understands this, and that logically the unifying factor behind disparate policies from the creation of ‘DOGE’ to the enfeebling of NATO are driven by a brutal sense of austerity, that starts with the cutting down of all the international public goods that the US has invested in since Bretton Woods.

In this context, the ‘beggaring’ of Europe pushes the bill for European security back across the Atlantic and has shaped the debate in Europe towards greater debt accumulation (for example the debt brake is one of the most contentious topics for the new German government and the EU will soon embark on the issue of EU defence bonds). Japan, South Korea and Australia might be next.

In effect, the White House is using areas where America is exceptional – financial markets, the military and multinationals – to coerce its allies, and in the case of Ukraine to undermine them. Debt might be next.

The closest we have to a template for a Trump grand macro plan is a paper written by Stephen Miran, who may soon take up the role of head of the Council for Economic Advisers. The elements in this plan have popularly become known as the ‘Mar-A-Lago Accord’, which is not unlike the world debt conference idea I have written about in The Levelling, though my version takes place in the recently refurbished Raffles (Singapore).

One of the pillars of the cited ‘Mar-A-Lago Accord is that holders of Treasuries exchange these securities for very long-term loans (that might not provide a coupon). The result would be to restructure the maturity and fiscal burden of America’s debt load. It is a neat idea but will not work in practice. Any debt accord will likely need the impetus of a major financial crisis as a motivator, will need to restructure the debt of all the major economies and will entail a rewriting of financial regulations across the world (for pension funds for example).

In reality, an attempt to enact a Mar-a-Lago Accord, in the same fashion as the debate around NATO, may create aversion (distrust in) to US financial assets and the dollar. Whilst Europeans may not appreciate the extent to which a ‘beggar thy neighbour’ philosophy is driven by US security policy, the White House is underestimating the value that America’s wide ranging financial, diplomatic and commercial infrastructure bring it. An example is that close to 40% of the revenues of large American firms come from overseas.

In the short-term, we are also starting to witness the effects of austerity on the American economy. Though ‘hard’ data on the economy remain solid, the outlook will become very noisy in the next few months as government job cuts take hold and as social welfare cuts (notably in the mortgage industry) sow anxiety. Markets have started to become jittery too, amidst a belief that the administration is much more focused on lowering bond yields (and thus the cost of government debt) than boosting the stock market.

In a scenario where the (US) economy weakens, investors normally turn to Treasuries, but the prospect of a Mar-A-Lago Accord being foisted upon them could lead to a buyers’ strike. The public attack on president Zelensky has disabused diplomats of the intentions of the Trump White House, investors could be next.

Have a great week ahead,

Mike

Remember the Washington Consensus?

Does anyone remember the Washington Consensus? Such a phrase might seem odd in today’s world but in the early 1990’s the notion of a ‘Washington Consensus’ was very powerful as a method for globalisation, and hotly debated by the left.

Globalisation worked well because, to be overly simplistic, it was facilitated by a very clear world order that helped to establish the rules of the ‘globalisation game’ and the norms associated with this. At their core, these rules were American, or at the very least they were made in Washington within the institutions that were set up to marshal the post-World War II world order, the IMF (International Monetary Fund), the World Bank and the United Nations in New York. America held the purse strings of these organisations and regular meetings at these institutions became a means of schooling ministers from both developing and emerging economies in the ways of American economic power.

These discussions aired what soon became known as the ‘Washington Consensus’ – effectively an approach to world economic development and globalisation, that was denounced by critics on the left as a neo-liberal policy recipe book. With the benefit of hindsight today, the Washington Consensus was valuable in the sense that it was a consensus, it encapsulated an approach that many countries were content to go along with as part of their first foray into real economic development.

Today, the Washington Consensus is in disarray. The institutions that it was built around, like the IMF are defunct, and others like the WTO have been undermined by both China and the US in recent years. The decision of the US to leave the World Health Organisation is another blow. The ‘Consensus’ is dead because there are now other competing methods as to how countries can develop, and of the independent paths they can take.

Here, an important milestone was Xi Jinping’s China Dream speech, in November 2012, which well before MAGA (Make America Great Again) coined the term ‘China Dream’ during a visit to the National Museum of China. Now, countries like Indonesia or Nigeria can try to follow the classical Western model of development, or China’s non-democratic, state led approach. Or, like Argentina and El Salvador, they can pursue the ‘Trumpian’ model that is taking a grip on Washington, but that is anything but a consensus.

Without going into day-by-day developments coming from the White House, the second Trump presidency can be seen as an early stage in the post-globalisation world order.

Globalisation was based on American economic and political strength and promulgated by the ‘Washington Consensus’ and the B-52’s of American capitalism (multinationals). Eventually globalisation ran out of steam, and events like Brexit, the first Trump presidency and the snuffing out of Hong Kong’s democracy shattered it. We are now in a multi-polar world where at least three large powers (EU, China and the US) do things increasingly differently (look at how they treat AI).

Uniquely, this Trump presidency represents an attempt to do something new and can be seen as an early chapter in the formation of the new world order, and to an extent its success depends on the will and the coherence of the groups of people that are driving the Trump project (from sectors like private equity, innovation and wealthy families). One stark difference with globalization is already clear. Globalization was built on the US being umbilically tied to much of the rest of the world, and vice versa, by flows of ideas, money, trade and people. In contrast, it now seems that Trump 2.0 relies on American exceptionalism, attempting to rise above the rest of the world, and in the process severing the relationships and ties built up since the end of the First World War.

For example, consider the words delivered to Canadians by President Kennedy in May 1961 ‘Geography has made us neighbors. History has made us friends. Economics has made us partners. And necessity has made us allies’ and how remarkably different they are to the way the Donald Trump has treated Canada.

In that context, the rest of the world may increasingly choose to avoid America, and the risk to ‘Exceptional America’, notably with the dollar as strong as it is, is that its financial power ebbs, in the way that of many other empires has. The template for this is expertly laid out in Barry Eichengren’s ‘Mars or Mercury’ paper that analysed the link between empires and their monies, though I feel that in the absence of obviously strong competing currencies, this thesis could take time to play out.

A more plausible side-effect of ‘exceptional’ America, is the advent of a new point of economic gravity, pinpointed at the UAE (United Arab Emirates). This is my ‘Fourth Pole’ thesis – that the UAE together with India and Saudi Arabia has the makings of a new pole of trade and commercial activity, with low regulatory barriers and that encompasses a potentially huge market (Prof Afshin Molavi calculates that there are 2.5bn bn people within five hours flying time of Abu Dhabi). The Mercosur trade deal between Latin America and the EU might also be the basis for a new trade corridor.

The other necessary outcome in a world where America is going its own way, is that Europe stops trying to contain Trump, and takes a far more aggressive stance with respect to its risk environment, notably Russia. The German election in two weeks’ time might be the start of that stance.

Have a great week ahead,

Mike

Empire

Donald Trump will be president of the United States for a second time, defying those who thought his first term was an anomaly and who considered that the American people still care about the rule of law. He will preside over the 250^th anniversary of US independence, the next Olympics and World Cup.

This is an election result of such great consequence that it will decide whether America’s hegemony is renewed, or that its empire fades like so many others have done through the ages. Fittingly, I woke up to the news of Trump’s victory in Vienna, a city that knows a thing or two about empires. In that context, an interesting and possibly underread book is ‘The Hapsburg Way – 7 rules for turbulent times’ by Eduard Habsburg, known formally as the Archduke of Austria and now a career diplomat for Hungary.

Of Habsburg’s seven rules, the most important are ‘Believe in the empire, and your subsidiarity’ and ‘Respect law and justice’. Trump will likely not do well on these counts, nor does he score on ‘Be Catholic’ though the Catholic church has chased his coat-tails through the electoral campaign. He does better on ‘Get married and have many children’ and ‘Be brave in battle’.

The book is full of interesting snippets, such as that the first governor of Texas (in 1691) was installed by the (Spanish) Habsburgs. In that respect the only blemish in the book is the foreword, written by Habsburg’s boss Viktor Orban, who this week held court over his European counterparts in Budapest, in the wake of the Trump victory.

While I think that Trump will be much more disruptive for Asia and Europe, and that his presidency will see an unprecedented re-shaping of the Middle East, a great deal of media attention is devoted to his impact on Europe and NATO. Overall, the reaction is far too alarmist and the vision of world leaders cowering before Trump gives little acknowledgement of his and America’s vulnerabilities.

Despite this, with near comic timing, only hours after Trump’s victory was confirmed, the squabbling German government fell apart, a development that has been simmering for some time.

Germany will likely have an election next March, and this is good news. Scholz’ ineffective and indecisive government will be thrown out (Scholz may also be replaced by Boris Pistorius at the head of his party), and Germans will vote in a centre-right government, if polls are to be believed. There is very strong appetite on the part of German businesses to restart the economy, unblock planning laws and rethink energy policy. This much was very clear to me when speaking with investors and businesspeople in Hamburg (after Vienna).

If a new centre-right government transpires in Germany, this should re-engage the political engine at the heart of Europe between France and Germany. But there is a small chance that Emmanuel Macron will not be president of France in a year’s time. Macron, who this week compared Europe’s fate to ‘herbivore in a climate of carnivores’, is fantastically unpopular in France and it cannot be discounted that the Rassemblement will try to bring him down in 2025. Similarly, there is a risk that far-right parties in Europe are emboldened by the Trump victory.

Apart from the travails of the German and French leaders, there is a shift of power going on across Europe – in favour of Poland and Italy, and towards the Baltics/Nordics. The sense is that a Trump led US will bring about the end to the Pax Americana, which may initially leave Europe more vulnerable diplomatically, though ultimately it will become more independent (to America’s disadvantage). Arguably the loser here is the UK, stranded offside the EU, and at odds with Trump and his vice-president.

A Trumpian America, if true to the caricature, will leave Europe as the last bastion of democracy and independent institutions. This is a great challenge and one that most people are not ready for. In events I speak at, a trick question I pitch to the audience is to ask how many of them (usually accomplished, educated people) would enter politics – in most cases there are few volunteers. If European democracies are to be renewed, politics must re-civilise itself and to quote Eduard Habsburg, politics also needs more brave people.

Another area to watch is institutions. Donald Trump already politicized the Supreme Court and might well do the same with the Federal Reserve. On Thursday the Fed, oddly in my view, cut rates, but the press conference after the meeting was dominated by Chair Powell denying that he would resign if Trump requested, he do so. As America’s institutions may become more politicised, and world institutions like the UN and WTO become less relevant in a Trumpian world, Europe needs to ensure that the independence and competence of its institutions is pristine.

Returning to the topic of defense, perhaps the most interesting confirmation hearing (by the EU Parliament) of EU commissioners designate was that of Andrius Kubilius, the Lithuanian, first defense commissioner. His first task will be to deliver a paper (in 100 days from now) on the state of defense procurement, the integration of defense supply chains and the opportunities for a more intensive commitment to space technology. In his commentary, he revealed that a pan-European missile defense shield could cost up to Eur 500bn. So, we should brace ourselves for the issue of EU war bonds to pay for this.

To end this note with a very big picture view, in the context of the theme of the ‘Levelling’, Trump’s first victory was a wrecking ball to globalization. This second one shatters it completely and will try to remake America and the world order with a narrative and vision (‘tariffs’, ‘deportation’, ‘loyalty tests’) that will deglobalize. Politically, Trump has sold Americans a political vision based on the Leviathan (the people surrender their liberty to a singular leader in return for protection). Europe is still a ‘Leveller’ type system (bottom up democracies). Of the two approaches, I am with the Levellers.

Have a great week ahead,

Mike