Battle for Budapest

In the days before what is now known as the Iran War, and amidst the horrific suppression of its citizens by the Iranian state, a Dutch diplomat, having arrived at Tehran airport, was stopped and asked to disclose the contents of his luggage. He refused, citing diplomatic immunity, and left Iran, leaving his luggage behind. A subsequent inspection of the luggage in the presence of another Dutch diplomat, allegedly revealed three Starlink modems and a number of satellite phones.

It is not at all clear whether the devices were for ‘personal use’ or for the benefit of Iranian dissidents, but the incident reminded me of the efforts of George Soros to export hundreds of photocopiers into communist Eastern Europe in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, so that dissident texts could be copied and circulated.

This was the very tip of the iceberg of Soros’ funding of the pro-democracy movement in Eastern Europe, and at one point it was said that he gave more in aid than all the Western governments together. In particular Soros, who studied under the philosopher Karl Popper (author of ‘The Open Society and its Enemies’), was committed to creating an ‘open society’ in Hungary, the country of his birth, and established the Central European University (CEU) in Budapest in 1991.

Around the mid 1990’s I recall Bill Newton-Smith, a philosopher and Fellow at Balliol College and associate of Soros leaving England to help run the CEU. As he left Oxford, a young student activist called Viktor Orbán had come the other way (in 1990 I think), to begin a research fellowship on the topic of civil society in Europe, sponsored by the Soros Foundation.

Orbán didn’t last long at Oxford, returned home to become a member of parliament and the leader of the main liberal party Fidesz. Orbán has been a central figure in Hungarian politics since then, but in the late 2000’s, underwent a political and moral transformation. At a conference in Prague some years ago, I spoke with a few entrepreneurs who had been early associates of Orbán’s, and who had suspicions as to the motivation behind his change of tack.

This change pivoted on his relationship with Soros, who Orbán has transformed into a figure of hate for the far-right internationally. Equally, Orbán flipped his view on Russia. He had been highly critical of Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia, but soon after, following a visit to St Petersburg to meet Vladimir Putin, Orbán started to change his stance on Russia.

For much of the past sixteen years, Orbán has commanded a large amount of popular support, though his actions and attitude in going against the grain of the EU have cost Hungary – in the last fifteen years, Hungarian GDP growth has lagged that of Poland by 0.8% per annum, tens of billions in EU aid has been withheld, and corruption has become institutionalised under Orbán. Budapest has become a staging post for the Russian security services and teachers, women, judges, amongst others have suffered in ways they would not expect in a normal European country.

In this context, the general election in Hungary (April 12^th) could become a critical turning point, and is highly important for the EU. At a broad level, polls point to a victory for Peter Magyar of the Tisza Party, with the majority of the opposition parties in Hungarian politics having swung behind him. However, in the context of extensive gerrymandering, a propensity for ethnic voting groups (Hungarians living abroad and Roma in Hungary) to tilt toward Orbán, and the capture of state institutions and budgets, the outcome is highly uncertain.

Not only is Orbán an ally of Moscow (Orban’s team has been accused of leaking confidential EU discussions to Russian officials, and Orbán holds frequent meetings with the Russian foreign minister), but he has become the darling of the international MAGA movement. Orbán’s campaign been endorsed by Benjamin Netanyahu and Donald Trump, Marco Rubio visited Budapest in mid-February and vice president JD Vance will travel there on April 7^th, just before the election.

There are already allegations of impropriety and vote rigging against Orbán, in what will be a hotly contested election, and deep suspicion of social media influence by Russia, not to mention the support of the White House.

EU leaders fear a close election or that Orbán, having lost the vote, will use his remaining days to change laws and appointments to key institutions. The example of Poland is being mentioned, where on taking power Donald Tusk faced years of difficulty in removing hard-right opponents from media and other institutions.

As such, the EU will have to invest enormous time, energy and capital in remaking Hungary. The short-term gain for the EU will be the absence of the Hungarian veto on European foreign policy stances, notably so in the case of Ukraine.

Should Orbán win, or continue to contest a close vote, a more existential issue faces the EU that will centre around a gathering debate on how to further sanction and potentially expel an EU member that is steadfastly recalcitrant.

Lurking behind the election, is a deeper foreign policy issue for Europe, in the context of several major wars and the disintegration of NATO, the need to combat more fiercely interference in the democratic processes of EU member states.

Have a great week ahead,

Mike

Mars, Venus or just lost in space?

Two recent events have me thinking of a 2003 book by the international relations expert Robert Kagan, entitled ‘Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order’, which started life as a 2002 article in Policy Review. In the foreign affairs world, the book is known colloquially as ‘Mars or Venus’, because the opening sentence goes ‘Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus’.

Kagan’s aim was to explain that Europe and the US had very different views of the world, and that these differences were rooted in culture, history and aims. Europe is the older, wiser and more genteel continent, concerned with roping its social democracy in well made rules, whereas the relatively younger American republic (250 years old this year) was more muscular, in military and financial terms. Kagan’s book, in keeping with the reception given to Francis Fukuyama’s ‘The End of History’ and more recently Graham Allison’s ‘Destined For War’, is better known for its strapline than the detail of its argument, but then again that is the art of the successful author, and one that in comparison, few European international relations experts have cracked.

That, in 2002, Kagan felt the need to state that Europeans and Americans are different, betrayed the long-held sense that they are the same people, in the sense that in 2002, the vast majority of Americans could trace their family history back to Germany, Ireland, Britain and France (in 1960 some 85% of foreign-born Americans were from Europe in vs 10% today).

That much was also clear during the many events in Washington to mark St Patrick’s Day. President Trump invoked his own European heritage (Scottish mother, German father), teased Speaker Mike Johnson as to whether he was a WASP or Italian, whilst Taoiseach Micheal Martin told how a Cork man, Stephen Moylan, a senior officer in George Washington’s staff, is credited with the first use of the phrase ‘the United States of America’ in 1776.

In that context, the ‘Mars and Venus’ argument is ever more relevant today as the divide between Europe and its American cousins widens. While European countries wholeheartedly supported the US in the 1991 Kuwait War (see our recent note) and in the aftermath of 9/11, the doubts that many European governments had over the 2003 invasion of Iraq partly motivated Kagan’s book (the film ‘Quai D’Orsay is very good in this context).

In that context, the polite refusal of nearly all of America’s allies, not just in Europe but also the likes of Japan and India, to send ships to the Strait of Hormuz, is emblematic of a deepening divide, and in recent weeks a good number of American friends have reached out to ask ‘is it us, or is it you?’. My polite response is that ‘it’s the White House’ (noting that most Americans are against this war), but more broadly I feel that one of the great anomalies of our time is that so few Americans realise the damage that is being done to America’s reputation abroad.

So, one might argue that Kagan’s ‘Mars-Venus’ short-hand for international relations has never been more true, and the fact that Europe has done little in the past twenty years to bolster its security, and to deepen its financial markets, gives some weight to American frustration and derision. Equally, the vandalization of shared values (democracy) and institutions (NATO, the United Nations) by the White House causes horror across European capitals.

Yet, at this painful point in trans-Atlantic relations, I wonder if we have reached peak ‘Mars-Venus’, in the context that Europe today is still quite like it was in 2003 in terms of world view, whereas the US is politically and socially very different to that of 2003.

My reasoning is that Europe is finally having the ‘neo-con’ moment that the US went through in the early 2000’s (Robert Kagan was part of that movement), and is starting to rebuild its defences, though it lags badly on capital markets union (now Investment Savings Union).

Oddly, Europe no longer shares the same enemies as the US. Russia should be the prime concern of European security chiefs. It is also troubling that the Trump administration actively supports far-right parties like the AfD in Germany, and the few European nations who side with the Kremlin (VP Vance visits Hungary next week).

As such, Europe’s path and challenge is clear – to remain the sole liberal democratic pole in a disordered world. When Robert Kagan wrote his book in 2003, the natural assumption was that American democracy was a beacon for others to follow, as far as Asia and even across Eastern Europe (Kagan’s wife Victoria Nuland was a senior American diplomat serving in Eastern Europe during ‘the Maidan’ in 2014, where her most famous utterance was ‘f@#k the EU’).

Yet, America’s democracy is now in deep trouble, and one of the sharpest critics of Donald Trump’s approach is Robert Kagan, who warns of the descent towards a dictatorship.

It will be over by Christmas

Mon centre cède, ma droite recule, situation excellente, j’attaque

At the First Battle of the Marne, not so far from Paris, in September 1914, Marshall Foch sent the above, inspiring communiqué to Marshall Joffre (‘my centre is crumbling, my right is retreating, the situation is excellent, I attack!’). The Battle of the Marne was arguably the greatest land battle of the twentieth century and caused over 500,000 casualties. Its strategic effect was to halt and reverse Germany’s lightning attack across France towards Paris and set the scene for years of entrenched warfare. At the time, the Great War was some three months old, and many thought that ‘it will be over by Christmas’.

There are few parallels between the First World War and the Iran War, but there is a creeping feeling that, in the absence of a clear strategy from the White House (see last week’s note ‘Safe Places’), there is a risk that this conflict becomes entrenched.

It is already very costly. In the first week of the attack on Iran, the US apparently spent close to USD 11bn on weapons and munitions, and that is without calculating the human and economic costs. In the context of record public indebtedness, the question is not so much can America win the war, but can it afford it?

Indeed, it seems largely forgotten now that America’s own wars have been associated with indebtedness. That the American Revolutionary War was financed mostly by the French (Lafayette and Beaumarchais), Spain and the Netherlands – indeed in a lesson for policy makers today, Congress had to print money to pay off these loans, which had the effect of causing rampant inflation and devaluing the dollar. It’s also worth flagging that the American Civil War saw a sharp run up in debt (US sovereign debt in 1865 was 40 times what it was in 1860, according to figures from the Treasury), the consequence of which was a collapse in the dollar, again.

Still, the lesson that wars generally strain finances, seems to have been habitually forgotten. Some might recall that Larry Lindsey, an economic adviser to George W Bush’s administration left his job after producing what at the time was considered to be a high estimate (USD 200bn) of the costs of the second Iraq War. It turned out to be a conservative estimate, as the Congressional Budget Office put the cost of the war at USD 2.4bn and other analysts have put the total cost at closer to USD 5bn.

Equally, Britain and France are fascinating in many ways – they have very old and rich economies and together have been involved in most wars going back to at least 1000 AD. Britain is a nose ahead of France in that there is arguably a longer thread of data available about its economy, and it is very well curated by the likes of the Bank of England and the Office for Budget Responsibility, whose note on ‘300 years of public finance data’ is a must read for aficionados of economic history.

If I could sum up those 300 years of data it would be to state that wars drive indebtedness, and then indebtedness itself drives fiscal reform. Between 1700 and 1800, debt to GDP in Britain rose from 25% to close to 200%, during a period that was marked by wars over the Spanish Succession, the Austrian Succession, the Seven Years War, the American War of Independence and of course the Napoleonic Wars (after the French Revolution). As a rough rule, British participation in the many and varied wars of the 18^th century led to spikes in defence spending of up to 10%, whilst the more deadly world wars saw defence spending push beyond 50% (of GDP).

More broadly, the Kiel Institute has created a database of conflicts going back over the past 150 years that measures the economic costs of war and they have used this to create a model that scopes the potential economic costs of war scenarios. Though quite chilling in its consequences, their interactive tool is useful, and I recommend it to the White House.

For example, I input a scenario (based on 2023 economic valuations) for a war that takes place in Taiwan and also in China (assuming a dramatic US riposte). The direct economic and capital damages are well into the USD 20 trillion, and that is without counting US military losses and the disruptive effect on world trade, risk appetite, and financial market collateral damage.

So, not only do armies march on their stomachs as Napoleon hinted, but also on their balance sheets. In this alarming context, geopolitical ‘players’ have two pressing needs. One is to build out their military capabilities, and the other is to reduce debt – in part to allow them the fiscal space to be warlike. With the US now spending over USD 100 bn more on interest payments on its debt than on its military, it is living a strategic contradiction.

Have a great week ahead, Mike

Riddle of the Funds

A friend who lives in an isolated area and therefore in need of good reading material, recently asked me to recommend some geopolitical oriented thrillers. I immediately thought of decent, new writers in the field like David McCloskey and Charles Beaumont, the interesting recent James Stavridis/Eliot Ackerman books that straddle fact and fiction, as well as the scary ‘If Russia Wins’ by Carlo Masala.

However, many of my favourites are from different eras, Laurence Durrell’s ‘White Eagles over Serbia’ set during the Cold War, and then in a bygone period of great power competition, the works of Eric Ambler and of course, Erskine Childers (‘Riddle of the Sands’ ).

The end of globalization and the onset of great power competition means that those works remain relevant though, if on the fourth anniversary of the war on Ukraine European policymakers wanted reading recommendations, I might well propose a book like Sebastian Mallaby’s ‘The Power Law’, or Azeem Azhar’s ‘Exponential’, and to be cheeky, even ‘The Art of the Deal’.

My reasoning, with Europe (the EU, UK, Nordic nations) finally starting to mobilise its factories and innovators to bolster its war economy, is that there remain several missing elements in the quest to build the industrial champions of the European war economy. Europe’s politicians are very good at high minded rhetoric (there are repeated calls to build the European Google, Palantir and Anduril), and even better at racking up debt, but less gifted at spurring large scale innovation.

For instance, the response to the hostile American message to the EU at the 2025 Munich Security Conference was the lifting of the German debt brake, while the recent threat to ‘take’ Greenland has prompted multiple calls for the issue of ‘euro-bonds’.

However, with German military spending and defence related industrial production now taking off, the secret to defence and security innovation lies more in business school texts, than in war college. There are a few elements to highlight here.

The first one touches on a perennial problem for Europe, the lack of depth in financial markets. Amidst an epidemic of defence start-ups and fund launches across Europe, there are still relatively few investment funds focused on the kind of later stage investing required to scale security focused companies to a size where they can become part of the growing industrial infrastructure in Europe. This lacuna owes in part to the failure of Capital Markets Union (now Investment Savings Union), such that few pension funds and institutional managers are investors in ‘strategic autonomy’.

It also reflects a labour market problem – there are simply few investors in Europe who have good knowledge of the defence and dual use ecosystem.

The idea of an ecosystem is the second aspect of the defence investment riddle. A small number of countries have cracked this – the US and France stand out. In the US, like France, the education system provides a rich supply of engineers and technologically capable graduates (e.g. Onera Labs in France), many of whom have a layer of business school training, and in a good number of cases have ties to or experience in the military.

Ecosystems encompass large firms, divisions of the military and defence establishment (i.e. SpaceForce), as well as sector specialist investors. When the elements of such an ecosystem are connected and work together, they can propel an interesting start-up to a viable enterprise in a few years. A developed pan-European ecosystem does not exist, and its cultivation needs to surmount cultural obstacles (as the recent Future Combat Air System (FCAS) debacle has shown), tax and incentive policy, and a more open approach to innovation from large European firms.

Then, the element that is to my observation missing in many new defence focused start-ups and first-time investment funds is the presence of seasoned business operators who have experience in scaling businesses and advising on how best to navigate the various complex government procurement pathways across Europe.

This is a critical omission in the defence sector because government led procurement can help start-ups survive, but not necessarily grow. This is doubly so in dual-use technologies such as cyber security and hardware (including new materials), where ‘go to market’ is a more important imperative than ‘go to war’. Compared to the US, Europe has a short supply of such operators, and in general governments have not done a good job of encouraging them to become part of the ‘strategic autonomy’ economy.

Europe faces a diplomatic disengagement by the US, a grave security threat from Russia and industrial dislocation by China. As such, Europe’s war economy needs to add up to much more than guns and drones, but must rest on innovation, entrepreneurship and ambitious capital.

Have a great week ahead, Mike

Constellations

One of the highly unique, and fascinating characteristics of this era of unravelling is the way we increasingly look at the world from a geopolitical rather than a geographic point of view. In previous phases in history, geography and geopolitics aligned neatly – for example the democratic West faced off against the communist East while economically, the North was well ahead of the South. Now, select countries from disparate parts of the world share the same dilemmas and challenges. Japan, as a middle power, arguably has more in common geopolitically with the UK, than it does with Indonesia. In turn, Singapore and Ireland, arguably share the same geopolitical stress points.

In the post globalized world, new coalitions and constellations of countries are beginning to emerge. That much was on display at Davos two weeks ago, when Canadian prime minister Mark Carney eloquently pleaded the case of the democratic ‘middle powers’ and the need for them to collaborate. His speech was followed by the far less eloquent launch of Donald Trump’s ‘Board of Peace’, which is a ragtag band of largely developing countries not known for their commitment to the rule of law and appreciation of human rights.

As the various threads of globalization – from the use of the SWIFT payment system to energy pipelines like Nord Stream, the ‘special relationship’ between the UK and the US, NATO, USAID, and many more, fall by the wayside, new groups and alignments emerge, and in the rest of this note I will sketch some of them.

To start at the top of the pyramid, regular readers will know that David Skilling and I have extensively researched the phenomenon of small, advanced economies – a group that spans Sweden, Singapore, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Ireland, Belgium, Norway, Finland, Switzerland, Austria and Denmark, and that may in future incorporate the Gulf States.

Culturally, these countries are very different but share the same economic and social successes (‘happiest place to live’, ‘best rule of law’, ‘highest GDP’), and a common policy recipe that is based on innovation, openness, education and social cohesion. While we have even tried to create a policy forum for these countries (the ‘g20’), they do not act as a formal block, but actively compare notes behind the scenes. For example, the Nordic states are learning from each other and collaborating on immigration, while Ireland urgently needs to follow the examples of Singapore and Norway on defence.

Then, below the small, advanced economies are the ‘middle powers’, sizeable, developed countries, many of whom enjoyed periods of international dominance, but are now beset by demographic issues (ageing and immigration), and are searching for a defined geopolitical role. Japan, the UK, Canada, Korea, Australia and Russia (not big enough economically to be a superpower, and not nice enough either). With the exception of Russia, the middle powers are democracies and most are eager that the world stays much the same as it was during the period of globalization (at least in the case of Keir Starmer). As such they are beginning to hedge bets by aligning with larger powers, Russia with China, and the UK is now cultivating much better relations with the EU.

Looming over the middle powers are the three ‘great powers’ – China, the US and the EU, each with their strengths – military, finance and technology for the US, culture, liberal democracy, well-being and cities in the case of Europe, and industry and cultural cohesion in the case of China.

They will be the pillars of the emerging multipolar world, and in contrast to the globalized era where most countries adopted the American way of doing things, these three ‘blocs’ will increasingly do things their own, culturally specific way. AI is an example, but corporate governance might be another tack. In addition to these three behemoths, a ‘Fourth Pole’ made up of a core of India and the Gulf states, is possible, as we wrote back in November.

Those classifications still leave about fifty percent of the world’s population unaccounted for, whose nations collectively labour under the term ‘Global South’. These countries, from Nigeria to Indonesia to Bangladesh, share similar policy problems – the building of e-commerce driven economies, healthcare and urbanisation, to name a few but they are not at all at the level of policy exchange as the small, advanced economies, and many of them do not have structured economic models.

For some, the idea of the ‘Fourth Pole’ can become an interesting organizing point, but to a very large extent the survival of existing world institutions, from the UN to the World Bank, now depends on the large, populous emerging economies. Equally, the directions that these countries take in their political economy – do they follow the ‘Chinese model’, the European democratic one, or something else altogether. This policy question is vastly underestimated in the discourse on international economics and politics, partly because the ‘great powers’ are not leading by example.

Have a great week ahead, Mike

Arktika

In 2007 two Russian mini-subs, Mir-1 and Mir-2, dived over 4,000 metres below the Arctic Circle to plant a titanium Russian flag, and so launched a primitive claim to the geological treasures at the top of the world. In highly Bond-esque fashion, the subs were supported by Mi-8 helicopters and the Rossiya, Russia’s most powerful nuclear-powered icebreaker.

The exploit was criticized by the then Canadian foreign minister as ‘15^th century’ buccaneering but won the three Russian expedition leaders the medal of ‘Hero of the Russian Federation’ (they were accompanied by a Swedish scientist and an Australian adventurer).

The episode highlighted how the scramble for rare places (we wrote about this in 2021) – the Arctic, Antarctic and outer space, are becoming strategic theatres in a world of great power rivalry. As much was emphasized in 2011 when then Secretary for State Hilary Clinton attended the Arctic Council meeting in Nuuk, a hitherto obscure club, to strengthen America’s commitment to the Arctic.

In that context, it is no surprise that the Trump administration has discovered the strategic importance of Greenland, although there is not a single mention of it in the recent National Security Strategy document. The White House might have asked nicely and had its way to place listening stations and missile batteries in Greenland, but instead the President has banalised his office and his country, and placed in jeopardy the most important geopolitical alliance of the past twenty years.

In doing so he has proven my ‘Rule of Unravelling’ which states that in the post globalization era, all of the constructive institutions and values of the globalized world will be stress-tested, in some cases to breaking point. For instance, the UN is invisible and impotent, and the most sacred of American institutions, the Federal Reserve, has come under a full-frontal attack in recent months. NATO it seems is next.

In most European capitals, especially those with large professional armies, there is considerable doubt that, under the Trump administration, the US will be a reliable ally. The immediate implication is to change the calculus that underpins any security guarantee for Ukraine, and indeed the process by which Ukraine will eventually become a member of the European Union.

Europe already significantly outstrips the US in terms of the extent to which it funds Ukraine (relative to GDP, Denmark is the biggest donor), but the intent of this aid will now have to become more lethal, in terms of what Ukraine can do with the arms provided to it, and craftier, in terms of the ways Ukraine can work with European armies to upset Russia’s war machine.

More broadly, there is also growing chatter that NATO is defunct, and will in effect be replaced by a European army (the Spanish foreign minister, amongst others, called for this last week).

A first step here might be an augmentation (and accelerated implementation) of the EU SAFE (Security Action for Europe) program that allows member states to borrow to fund military equipment for joint use, especially where the bulk of that equipment is made in the EU. Canada is a member of the SAFE, and stupidly the EC made it all but impossible for the UK to join. But, US arms manufacturers will have a hard time selling in Europe.

An EU army could very easily be put together around the structures of existing cooperation agreements, and of course, the structures that have been put in place by NATO. Yet, there is still a considerable amount of work to do however on optimizing collaboration in areas like cyber warfare, intelligence sharing and logistics infrastructure (the EU aims to create a ‘Military Schengen’ by 2027).

The aim of such an army would be the defence of European interests and territories, which in practice takes aim at Russia, but can be broadly interpreted to also cover counter-terrorism, space and the deep seas. In the context of the spat over Greenland, the composition of such an army could encompass elements that are not traditionally classed as military activities, such as economic war, but that in a total war world, might be part of the greater arsenal.

In Europe, the response to each crisis is to create a ‘Union’. In the same way that the euro-zone crisis led to the idea of Capital Markets Union, Europe’s ‘neo-con’ moment may produce a ‘Defence Union’, but unlike CMU, there is now a deadly sense of urgency. To my mind, it is still not at all clear that Europe’s political leaders are ready to command a large, capable military machine.

In a recent note ‘Year of the Riposte’ and in a talk at University College Cork with Prof. Andrew Cottey (‘Europe under Siege), I highlighted the litany of challenges that have been put to European leaders by the White House, China and Russia. In every case, the response has been a mixture of panic and a floundering search for compromise. Europe still dances to the tune set by Trump and others, as the Greenland fiasco has shown.

For example, in an underestimated speech at Davos, Friedrich Merz told the audience that ‘he gets it’ on defence and security. Yet, military procurement and recruitment are inefficient and sluggish.

Europe’s leaders have not yet passed the test set out in our recent ‘Riposte’ note ‘the litmus test for Europe in 2026 is to stop reacting to the disorder that others sow, but to build a positive narrative around the EU, and critically to riposte in a meaningful way against its adversaries’.

Soon they will have no choice, In 2019, Emmanuel Macron boldly stated that ‘NATO is brain dead’. It is now.

Have a great year ahead, Mike

2026 – Year of the Riposte

In foreign affairs, the great surprise of 2025, has not been tariffs or the geo-politicisation of AI, but the flipping of American foreign policy to apparently align with Russia, jettison the rule of law, tolerate China, and as our recent, prescient note underlined, rediscover Latin America (‘The Land Full of Vibrancy and Hope’). The ‘exit’ of Nicolas Maduro further undermines the rule of law and reinforces the view of a ‘spheres of influence’, where the bad are emboldened and the good are imperiled.

The big disappointment has been the slow, meek reaction of Europe to the above, the low point of which was the reference to Trump as ‘daddy’ by Mark Rutte, former Dutch prime minister and now NATO chief. Indeed, 2025 might also be described as Europe’s ‘neo-con’ year, when its leaders were mugged by the reality of strategic competition, and more specifically the mendacity of Vladimir Putin and the election of Donald Trump.

There are several strands to this. The first is the shock at the delivery of the message that America (the ‘White House’) is in effect dis-engaging from Europe and shattering the idea of the ‘West’. From the shambles of the Munich Security Conference to the communication of the National Security Strategy, there is still a shock felt across the continent to the change of direction that the White House is pursuing. A notable sign of this is how, in the post-Brexit world, Britain has become much closer to Europe on security and defence and is in the lead on strategy around Ukraine. A consequence of America’s ‘flip’ of this reaction, which I feel is not yet appreciated in the US, will be a much reduced willingness to buy American goods and services.

In practical terms, the new geopolitical climate is revolutionising defence spending in Europe. The Baltic and Nordic states, as well as Poland, are all increasing defence budgets amidst warnings of a future confrontation with Russia. Most notably, Germany has cast aside its debt brake to target Eur 1trn in extra defence spending in the next decade, and the EU’s Eur 150bn loan facility has closed its loan round. Europe is now in effect in a three year scramble to build defensive infrastructure, and there is also growing talk of more offensive (i.e. cyber) actions against Russia.

Beyond the manner of the delivery of US diplomacy there is a mixture of anger and confusion in Europe at the stance of the White House. One is the apparent untethered nature of US diplomats like Steve Witkoff, his alleged closeness to Russia and the peace deal proposals he has concocted. This has caused concern because of the time, energy and political capital that European leaders have had to spend (with Ukraine) counteracting the US/Russia proposal.

A second source of ire is the apparent support by the White House for far-right parties in Europe – the AfD, Reform in the UK and the Rassemblement in France – all of whom have proven ties to Russia, all of whom hold 30% or more in opinion polls and all of whom are in direct opposition to governments in the three largest European countries.

It is also worth noting that the tension provoked by the White House has not brought Europe any closer to China – the perceived dumping of Chinese goods (electric vehicles for example) in Europe, and China’s support of Russia’s war in Ukraine are two major sticking points.

One relative bright spot on the horizon is that growth is beginning to pick up across Europe – bank lending is expanding, unemployment already low and lead indicators perking up. In that context it is likely that growth surprises to the upside next year. One great challenge, which has dropped from the policy limelight in the context of the focus on defence, is the Savings and Investment Union (old Capital Markets Union), and this is an essential part of the policy landscape in the coming year.

Looking ahead, across individual countries, there is now a consensus view in the UK that Sir Keir Starmer could be toppled as prime minister by his Labour colleagues (Wes Streeting is favourite to take over, and another Blairite Yvette Cooper, cannot be ruled out either). A recent YouGov poll showed Starmer to be the most unpopular prime minister in the past fifty years, and Rachel Reeves is the most unpopular Chancellor. The only European leader who is further adrift in the opinion polls than Starmer is Emmanuel Macron.

Macron, it seems, has given up, and in France the political debate bypasses him and is steadfastly focused on the next presidential election which should take place in May 2027 though it is not impossible that an attempt is made to unseat him in 2026. The election to watch is in Hungary, where the pro-Russia/anti EU prime minister Viktor Orban is behind in the polls to Peter Magyar’s TISZA party. A return of Hungary to the pro-EU ‘fold’ would be welcome and would constitute a blow to Russia.

To that end, and in the context of the damp squib that was the last EU summit, the litmus test for Europe in 2026 is to stop reacting to the disorder that others sow, but to build a positive narrative around the EU, and critically to riposte in a meaningful way against its adversaries. Greenland might be an early test.

Have a great week (and new year) ahead, Mike

Guns and Roses

It looks like I will have to burn all the Biggles books I collected as a child and jettison any antique copies of ‘Eagle’ comic books, because there are reports that Britain and Germany are about to sign a defence co-operation agreement, ending a long stretch of history where they have been on opposing sides. Indeed, the entire literature of what George Orwell described in his essay ‘Boys’ Weeklies’ could now be caught offside.

For instance, the work of John Buchan, once Governor General of Canada, and well known as the author of the ‘Thirty Nine Steps’, may be especially dislodged by an agreement that casts Germany and Britain as best geopolitical friends, as many of his books, like those of Captain W.E. John, depend on the role of the indispensable British hero seeing off his German nemesis. An innovation on the part of Buchan, was the glamorous female mastermind, Hilda von Einem, who vies with the handsome Irish intriguer Dominic Medina (please do read ‘Greenmantle’ and the ‘Three Hostages’) as the foil to Richard Hannay.

One of the significant moments of history when Britain and Germany (Prussia then) found themselves on the same side was the Battle of Waterloo, one of the great contests, where during a pounding from French guns Wellington’s officers asked for orders he replied, ‘there are no orders, except to stand firm to the last man’.

One of the survivors was Henry Percy, aide de camp to Wellington, who after the Battle had to row halfway across the Channel with the news of the Duke’s victory, as an absence of wind had halted his sloop. On arriving in England he found that many (in the City) already knew of the victory owing, allegedly, to a network of agents assembled by Nathaniel Rothschild who is said to have made a fortune on the event and thereby spawned the phrase ‘buy on the sound of cannons’. It is a useful illustration of the roles of communications (social media today) and finance in war.

Indeed, part of the reason that Germany and Britain are moving closer together on defence (France is even closer to each one militarily) is finance. Gone are the days when London and Berlin could afford to spend 9% of GDP building great battleships in the lead-up to the First World War (Margaret MacMillan’s ‘The War That Ended Peace’ is worth a read), and now they must do with more meagre ambitions and newfound collaborations.

In this context, the recent NATO Summit was a watershed as it signalled a headline commitment to 5% defence spending across NATO countries (as a % of GDP), something that would have been unthinkable four years ago.

In Europe, there is a sense that some of the defence spending pledges amount to a ‘fudge’, and it is very clear that defence spending as a % of GDP does not translate into defence readiness. Of the European members of NATO, the UK, Greece, France, Poland, the Nordics and Baltics are the most defence ready, and some of them are already spending ambitiously. For example, Poland is set to reach a level of defence spending of 4% of GDP and has already struck a strategic military procurement partnership with South Korea.

On the other hand, countries like Italy and especially Spain have been castigated for their reluctance to spend. Italy has talked of including investment in a bridge from the mainland to Sicily as defence infrastructure and in the case of Spain, it has apparently tried to ‘kitchen sink’ other tangential forms of spending into the defence segment.

Still, the broad 5% target is a gamechanger, and is comprised of two parts – close to 3.5% on defence spending and then 1.5% on areas like cyber security and AI driven defence capabilities. Momentum will be boosted by the EU’s Eur 150 bn lending facility for defence procurement, up to Eur 3bn in loans from the EIB (European Investment Bank), and the German government’s significant augmentation of its defence budget. Still, this fiscal support leaves an enormous shortfall that will likely require capital from the private sector.

In this respect, we are at the cross-over of geopolitical forces. NATO as an operating construct has been thrown into doubt by Donald Trump and the actions of his defence policymakers (the latest act being to deprive Ukraine of defensive missiles). As such, Article 5 no longer seems as watertight as it did in the early 2000’s (it has only been invoked once, in September 2011, by Nick Burns, then US Ambassador to NATO). The impression many in Brussels have is that Europe will be left to defend itself from Russian aggression – there is now a parlour game amongst the various European intelligence agencies to estimate when a Russian incursion might occur.

As a result, the EU will become a much bigger player in defence procurement (see the recent White Paper here), Europe’s defence centric innovation economy will grow rapidly, and ‘war bonds’ will become a new asset for investors. Europe’s main threat is most obviously Russia, in addition to cyberwar from further afield. The danger in the long-term is that it finds itself as the last bastion of democracy, amidst a range of large, autocratic countries.

To return to Germany and Britain, anyone who reads the MacMillan books can’t escape the recognition that the arms race between Germany and Britain over one hundred years ago, is now being repeated by the US and China. Ultimately Europe may count itself lucky to stay out of this context.

Have a great week ahead,

Mike

Orientalism

It is likely that many of the people protesting for Palestine in US universities will have read Edward Said’s book ‘Orientalism’, or at least will have an idea who he was. It is also likely that they will have heard of Donald Trump, whose ire at these protesters has led to an unexpected fiscal crackdown on many prominent US universities including Columbia, where Said used to teach (see our recent note ‘University Challenge’).

In brief, the tack of Orientalism was to criticise the construction of a superior, Westernised view of the Middle East (the term was coined by navigators in the US Navy), that is then internalised by members of the Middle Eastern elite. At this broad level the theory was attractive, but runs into many practical difficulties such as Said’s downplaying the role of women, and the failure of many Middle Eastern countries to develop economically and to nurture the kinds of open society that Said liked to live in.

As with many facets of the debate around the Middle East, ‘Orientalism’ has become a badge of honour for many, and a contentious identifier for others, and there is a risk that many people who hold the ‘Orientalist’ view, have not updated their outlook for say the rise of Al Qaeda in the broad region and the effective domination in the last decade, of Palestinians by Hamas.

I doubt that Donald Trump has read ‘Orientalism’ (I think his speechwriter might have though) but in the light of the Western perspective of the Middle East, his visit to Saudi Arabia was striking in two respects.

First, like any clever politician, he confirmed the view that several countries in the region want to have of themselves

– ‘this great transformation has not come from Western interventionists … giving you lectures on how to live or how to govern your own affairs. No, the gleaming marvels of Riyadh and Abu Dhabi were not created by the so-called ‘nation-builders,’ ‘neo-cons,’ or ‘liberal non-profits,’ …instead, the birth of a modern Middle East has been brought about by the people of the region themselves’

To a degree, Trump’s view is not correct. The economies of the UAE and KSA were built on Western know-how (see David Mulford’s ‘Packing for India’ for example), and many of the financial institutions at least have mimicked those in the US and UK. Also, a large number of army officers from the region have been trained in imperialist bastions such as Sandhurst.

At the same time, the miraculous growth of these countries can be ascribed to local vision and leadership, on a scale only matched by Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore. And, consistent with the ‘Orientalism’ thesis, many people in the West do not acknowledge the rising institutional role that Abu Dhabi plays in the region, or the extent to which Mohammed bin Saman has become a hero for the youth in his country. In that regard, we might say that the model the Middle Eastern countries have followed is the ‘Sinatra Model’ (‘do it my own way’) with a slight American twist.

The President’s address struck a chord because in the Emirates and the KSA in particular, there is a growing pride and independence in what these countries have achieved economically, and on my last visit there a few months ago, I found that there was little patience on the part of government officials to for example, have EU regulatory standards imposed on joint investment projects. In a note I wrote at the time I flagged how locals had developed their own acronym of the West (W.E.N.A.), surely proof that the ideas in ‘Orientalism’ are dated.

Trump’s speech will be a big disappointment for those who believe in institutions and the idea of nation-building, and in that regard will turn on its head the efforts of so many in the State Department and other institutions. Neither does it augur well for current day American institutions.

The speech also brings into focus what Prof. Afshin Molavi refers to as the existence of ‘two Middle Easts’, namely a geopolitical one (sustained by American defence agreements) and an economic one. Chillingly in the context of the annihilation of Gaza, the Trump speech has tilted the momentum towards the economic version, and I feel that many people in Europe vastly underestimate the focus that governments in the region have on the economic prize, as opposed to the humanitarian catastrophe.

Various countries in the region from Qatar to Syria, may now find themselves the beneficiaries of Mr Trump’s lack of attachment to history and the democratic model, and it is very likely that the region known broadly as the Middle East will be one of the very few in the world to profit from his presidency, and will spearhead a move towards a model of materialistic, technocentric non-democracies, that some of Mr Trump’s supporters have in mind for the USA.

The emergence of the ‘Fourth Pole’, a prospective multipolar zone that will become the beneficiary of trade tensions between the ‘older’ multipolar zones (US, EU, Asia), is still very much on track, but as it develops it will increasingly need institutions, markets, rules and means of binding people to the region, none of which Mr Trump can help with.

Full Mettle Jacket

A week ago I started reading Admiral Jim Stavridis and Elliott Akerman’s second book, ‘2054’, which like the first (‘2034’) is a work of fiction designed to tell us about how our own world is evolving and the risks that will confront us. Without spoiling the plot, ‘2054’ demonstrates how new technologies can be deployed in nefarious ways, with the goal of turning the tide of geopolitics. However, as much as I enjoy the work of the Stavridis/Akerman team, my reaction to ‘2054’ was much the same as ‘2034’ (‘2034 – are we already there?’), which is that it has been rendered out of date by bizarre events in the real, political world

The detonation of over seventy years of American diplomacy and soft power by the various speeches and deeds of the Trump administration is a fin de siècle moment, that has drawn comment across the diplomatic world (the most pertinent was that of the Singaporean defence minister who described how he saw the USA moving from a force for ‘moral legitimacy’ to a landlord seeking rent’).

The worry now is that the US will treat its allies like enemies and its foes like friends. There was much consternation in Europe, but as this note has argued so many times, very few European countries have faced up to the challenges of the post-globalized world (Mario Draghi’s speech to the EU parliament last week put it very well…’do something!’).

There is now a furore over Eur 500 bn defence bonds, joint nuclear shields and defence equipment shopping lists. But, a more urgent task than buying fighter jets is the need for Europe to have a coherent security strategy. In a weekend where many are anticipating the results of the German election, a neglected development was the collapse of government formation talks between Austria’s centre-right OVP and the far-right FPO.

Some weeks ago, the parties had agreed on an economic programme, but could not settle on a common foreign policy, a critical stumbling point was oversight of the intelligence services (the OVP wanted to be in charge). This is a sensitive topic given that the FPO has a soft spot for the Kremlin, and specifically the fact that in 2018 the Herbert Kickl (FPO leader), when he was Austria’s interior minister, ordered an investigation into the country’s security services. Today, few of its EU peers share intelligence with Austria.

Reflecting that, the immediate challenge from Russia is infiltration, sabotage and manipulation across Europe (the Gerasimov doctrine and David Kilcullen’s work on Russian/Chinese tactics are both worth a read here ‘From Great War to Total War’). The EU has done relatively little to push back on this interference, and now has an urgent security (as well as defence) challenge.

This could take various forms.

The first is to penalise EU states that systematically go against the grain of the policies, values and interests of the Union. Hungary is the main offender here and whilst some EU funds have been withheld from Viktor Orban, the EU has in general failed to confront him. In the recent past there has been talk in the European parliament of excluding Hungary from the EU, which is technically difficult, but is a necessary part of a more ideologically consistent Europe, and one where bad actors face a penalty for their actions.

A second strand is to have much greater oversight over the movement of Russians in Europe, and of their capital. Vienna, Milan and the south of France, not to mention parts of Switzerland, are popular destinations for wealthy Russians and some European capitals are saturated with Russian money (Mark Hollingsworth’s book ‘Londongrad’ is instructive here as is Oliver Bullough’s ‘Butler to the World’). To emphasise the point, Russian interference in UK and lately Irish politics has not been aggressively countered, and my fear is that this is much worse in other countries like Germany.

Instead of clamouring to buy rocket launchers, Europe’s political classes have a lot to do domestically to shut the door on Russian interference in European affairs.

Then, on a more structural level, there is scope for much greater intelligence sharing across governments and joint task-forces on organised crime (gangs are a favourite extension of the Russian state). From the point of hardware, there is a need for increased joint use of satellites and electronic warfare collaboration.

The distinction between security and defence is an important and urgent one and a reminder of how complacent European governments have been. Whilst defence capabilities will take time to build up, the measures to be enacted in the security domain are less challenging to operationalise, but constitute a real test of European governments’ mettle.

Have a great week ahead,

Mike