Clime and Punishment

This January was the hottest January on record, at a temperature of 1.75°C above the average for the month (2024 was the hottest year on record with 150 extreme weather events). February was the month with the highest level of economic policy uncertainty since the 1990’s (excluding COVID). Something must be brewing but, the global narrative is so concentrated on the White House and intensely short-term that in a way, the future has been obscured.

Whether we like it or not, climate damage is part of that future path, and will play its own role in the disorder and re-ordering of the international political economic landscape to come. Regular readers will know that in the framework of my ‘Levelling’, imbalances like the crisis of democracy, climate damage and debt will have to be overcome before a new world order is fully established.

In particular, the deepening of climate damage and the rise of indebtedness are correlated and both are ‘world’ problems, at a time when coordination between the great powers is at its lowest ebb since the 1930’s. For game theorists at least, this produces a tricky equation – how to achieve a global solution or compromise when the main players in the game are trying to steal a march on each other.

Some of the pathways for climate warming are worrying (taking a range of datapoints from the IPCC, Berkley-Earth institute and the Global Carbon Project), if countries implement the commitments agreed at COP-Paris then global warming will be 2.4°C higher than the long-term average temperature by 2050, with current climate policies the increase is expected to be close to 3.5°C and with no climate policy adjustment it might be in the range of 4-5°C. Granted that a 1°C change in world average temperature can translate into a 4°C increase in some of the most climate precarious countries, this last scenario is frightening.

If climate damage encroaches on some of the thresholds mentioned above, it will become even more of a strategic issue for the economy (there is a good literature review here), the technology sector, financial markets and security. Indeed, the 2023 yearly threat assessment produced by the US Director for National Intelligence highlighted that ‘Climate change will increasingly exacerbate risks to U.S. national security interests’.

This report might well become a collector’s item because Pete Hegseth the new Defence Secretary recently (Jan 25) tweeted that ‘The (Department of Defence) does not do climate change crap’. Whilst the US economy is a very powerful driver of climate technology (Texas gets nearly a third of its electricity from wind power), its absence as a moral leader will mean weaker climate policy adherence by other countries.

In that context the link between climate damage and security will have to be made by others, notably the excellent team at UCL’s Dawes Centre for Future Crime, with whom I spent time last week exploring how climate damage is provoking new forms of crime and threats to security that go beyond the simple theft of copper wires and solar panels (a vibrant trade apparently).

There are a few strands in this emerging, important debate to draw out. Climate damage will in the long-run change cities, geographies and economies and produce migratory trends that malevolent states or non-state actors (gangs and organised crime) will exploit. Energy infrastructure is becoming more stressed because of climate change and the side-effects of this were evident last week with the closure of Heathrow following a fire in a nearby electricity substation.

In a more futuristic vein, the response to climate warming will create new technologies, some of them in the realm of geo-engineering which may be able to alter the effects of climate damage, but that might also be commandeered for harm. Then there is AI, which itself will create much greater demand for electricity, but that can help optimise energy usage, though the AI itself is vulnerable to manipulation.

Climate change is also leading to the development of new marketplaces – for carbon credits for example, as well as ESG driven assets and debt, but these new forms of financial market infrastructure are often illiquid, improperly regulated and prone to fraud.

What all this points to is that as climate damage provokes innovation, new infrastructure, technologies and markets in the context of a world where security is now a priority and where non-state actors (i.e. gangs) become more powerful and daring, the response to climate damage now also needs to have countermeasures built into it.

Have a great week ahead

Mike

From Brexit to Dixit

When the UK voted to leave the European Union, there was a strong consensus that proximate economies would suffer the macro fallout – Ireland, Belgium and the Netherlands were all expected to take a hit, and in particular I recall speaking with business leaders in both Brussels and Amsterdam at the time and registering their concerns for the local economy. In fact, Brussels was strengthened as a political capital by the way in which it managed the Brexit process, and Amsterdam has been bolstered as a financial capital by Brexit.

Returning to both cities, which sadly are off my well beaten track, I found great curiosity regarding the vision and tactics of Donald Trump. Like Brexit, Trump’s first term was about smashing globalisation, whilst his second term is an attempt to create a new world order, or at least a new American role in the world order.

The prosecution of his tariff strategy has been chaotic and unpredictable, and there are signs that the DOGE project to cut costs in the government sector is simply disruptive. As a result, policy uncertainty has spiked higher. For example, the Economic Policy Uncertainty index has shot to levels seen only during COVID. As such there is great concern that the US may tip into a recession or even that this is the express policy of the administration, with the goal of reducing borrowing costs (see ‘Un train peut cacher un autre’).

Neither the annihilation of the state nor tariffs may cause a recession, but uncertainty might. In this context, a very well regarded, though complex economics text worth knowing of is Avinash Dixit’s “Investment and Hysteresis’ appearing in a 1992 edition of the Journal of Economic Perspectives, and later as a book co-authored with Robert Pindyck. Avinash spent much of his career at Princeton and is a kind, softly spoken and thoughtful economist, in contrast to many of the more head-line grabbing varieties of the species we hear from on social media.

One of Dixit’s pre-occupations was the ways in which companies made investment decisions, and to summarise his findings in a crude way, he noted that firms often didn’t react immediately to a change in economic circumstances but opted to ‘wait and see’. As a result, an environment of high economic uncertainty produces inertia on the part of companies (and investors), but this can be beneficial to them as it gives them the option to wait and see how that environment develops.

We are in a ‘Dixit’ moment, where companies are beginning to stall investment plans because of the uncertainty emanating from the White House and the ever deeper fracturing of trade and diplomatic relationships across the world. In financial markets there is a risk that the capital market pipeline remains constipated as mergers and initial public offerings are stalled.

Similarly, the growing uncertainty of America’s diplomatic and military intentions is causing nation-states to change course. For example, Portugal has just cancelled an order for F-35 fighter jets and will instead buy European planes, while the centrepiece of Australia’s military strategy, AUKUS, is in disarray.

It is difficult to tell how long this ‘Dixit’ moment persists, and much depends on the Treasury and White House being able to communicate a clear economic strategy. Notably the administration has been silent on its intentions towards China, which strikes me as odd given that many members of the administration are united in their antipathy towards America’s geostrategic rivalry (Marco Rubio for example published ‘The World China Made’).

Until we have this clarity, markets will remain jittery, macro data will be unpredictable and activity will err towards the softer side in the US, but perhaps not in Europe where strategic clarity and ambition are picking up from low levels.

Granted that far too much of the macro debate focuses on the big multipolar zone (US, Europe and China), one of the pleasures of my visit to Amsterdam was the chance to meet with David Skilling (the expert on small, open economies) and also serendipitously with Afshin Molavi (the expert on ‘the other 75%’, by which I mean the emerging world economies). It is worth focusing a little on how both of these groups are adjusting to a changing world.

Many small open economies are now in a state of high alert, sceptical of the strategic consequences of the actions of the large nations. In many cases, they are mobilising militarily – the Nordics and Baltic states are an example, and in a recent note I detailed how Singapore, though it is one tenth the size of County Cork, it has an active army nearly ten times the size of that of Ireland, and a reserve army of 250,000 well trained soldiers).

At the other end of the spectrum, large populous emerging countries (think of Indonesia, Nigeria and Bangladesh) are worried about the fallout of the US-China rivalry, but in many ways non-aligned and ambitious for their own economies. On a more positive note Afshin and I think that our ‘4^th Pole’ thesis – that the greater economic region linked by the UAE-Saudi Arabia and India – has the makings of a new pole of economic activity.

Have a great week ahead,

Mike

The Road to Serfdom

I was sauntering through the centre of Vienna last Wednesday, admiring its stylish cafes and bars, and Friedrich Hayek came to mind.

Hayek argued against the suffocating role of government (‘central planners’) on the economy and for greater individual liberty, and his arguments still contain a grain of truth in the context of many European economies. Ironically, Austria’s brand-new finance minister had previously worked as an economist for a trade union and might well prove to be an ‘anti-Hayek’.

Hayek was one of the inspirations (after he won the Nobel Prize in 1974) behind what many American libertarians call the ‘Austrian’ school of economics, and his book ‘The Road to Serfdom’ is undoubtedly on the bookshelves of the most ardent members of team Trump, alongside works like Ayn Rand’s ‘Atlas Shrugged ‘.

In the Americas, Hayek is a favourite of the ‘chainsaw’ economists, with a large dollop of irony given the push for total control of the economy by an elite. Indeed, the risk for Americans is that the dismantling of the government led economy in America risks turning Americans into serfs of the private sector. But, this scenario is not yet immediately obvious given the way public attention remains focused on Ukraine and the victims of American tariffs.

In the past six months, a very strong international narrative has spread around the notion of ‘American exceptionalism’. The US is exceptional in a few domains – fighting (military), finance and its multinationals. Donald Trump is using these exceptional pillars to influence other countries and to set in train his vision for a more isolationist America. The response from America’s erstwhile allies has been to rapidly re-arm and re-finance.

An important sign of this was the announcement by Friedrich Merz (with the SPD’s Lars Klingbeil and the CSU chief) of a new defence spending plan, which largely swerves the issue of the debt brake. That German and Japanese bond yields rose suggests that markets are pricing the reallocation of the bill for security as an international public good to America’s former allies.

The return of war as a topic in European debate will alarm many people, and it should not be underestimated. One of my recent notes highlighted how Europe likely faces an ongoing campaign of harassment, sabotage and destabilisation from Russia. The idea that Europe is on its own is now quite starkly taking hold.

While the drumbeat of war will add to stress in our lives, it is not (yet) part of them. For the great majority of people, the geopolitical debate remains one between elites, and so far, does not impact their everyday lives.

This is where European leaders need to pay more attention and try to reset the international narrative. If America is strong in fighting and finance, it is weaker in areas where Europe is strong, and we might say that the two continents are the mirror opposite of each other. In my view, Europe is strong in the areas that matter to most people, most of the time. Specifically, Europe, as a social democracy is the best place to live in the world (6.6% of the world’s population live in ‘full’ democracies), has generally free education and healthcare and its societies are peaceful (according to the UN, the murder rate in the US is 14 times that of Italy). Life expectancy in France for instance, is four years ahead of the USA. Health spending per capita in the US is well over double what it would be for a European country (13k vs. 6k).

In this context, my counterintuitive argument (to the ‘chainsaw economists’) is that America needs less Hayek, and more ‘Europe’.

The absence of a deep social security system in the US, and the difficulty of accessing decent healthcare at reasonable prices means that a huge number of Americans live in precarity. Demolishing the department of education and cutting state aid to veterans are just two measures that increase vulnerability.

The trend that is emerging, and which will become starkly visible in a recession, is of an American society where a small but important number of households (say 20%) are wealthy enough to live well and access high quality education and healthcare, 40% of households live with the stress of becoming economically vulnerable and a further 30% live in serfdom in the sense that they have no leisure time (Newsweek estimates that one third of American workers has a second job).

Income inequality in the US is at historically very high levels, and the share of total income garnered by the top 1% of the workforce is tipping levels only seen in the 1930’s. Viewed from the point of view of wealth, 38% of the world’s millionaires live in America and over half of the ultra-high net worth (wealth over USD 50mn) individuals in the world are American. Indeed, the top 1% of wealthy Americans own 18.5% of all wealth in America, while the ‘bottom’ 50% of Americans own just 3% of wealth.

As such, the Trump 2.0 programme may not free Americans from serfdom to the government but will make them serfs of a private sector.

As a parting shot, Europe might need a little dose of Hayek. To that end, social welfare systems, state pension plans and healthcare spending may need to be streamlined across Europe as the security agenda becomes more prominent.

Have a great week ahead,

Mike

Un train peut cacher un autre

Adam Smith, though better known now as an economist held the chair of Moral Philosophy at Glasgow and as such it’s fair to assume that he knew a thing or two about the intersection of economics, philosophy and politics, and that often a political crisis is motivated by an underlying economic crisis…hence the title of this note.

Smith lived during a time of mercantilism, which we might describe as a nationalistic approach to trade that aims to maximise the exports of a country whilst keeping imports to a minimum. In this context, Smith wrote of mercantilist nations that ‘their interest lies in beggaring their neighbours’, and the phrase ‘beggar thy neighbour’ has been often used in the economic context, usually when growth is scarce (the aftermath of the Great Depression and the Global Financial crisis)

With mercantilism and ‘beggar thy neighbour’ back in fashion, it is worth returning to Smith’s ‘Wealth of Nations, book IV’ where many of the observations Smith made chime with America today, such as:

‘The sneaking arts of underling tradesmen are thus erected into political maxims for the conduct of a great empire … . By such maxims as these, however, nations have been taught that their interest consisted in beggaring all their neighbours. Each nation has been made to look with an invidious eye upon the prosperity of all the nations with which it trades, and to consider their gain as its own loss. Commerce, which ought naturally to be, among nations, as among individuals, a bond of union and friendship, has become the most fertile source of discord and animosity’.

To that end, beyond the bonfire of American values and diplomatic relationships, there is an emerging, underlying logic to the policies of the White House that China, Japan and Europe need to pay attention to.

I have written many times in this note that the world economy is in the antechamber of a fiscal-debt crisis (listen to ‘Waking up to World Debt’). Unusually, all of the major economies have become indebted at the same time, and the process(es) by which they try to reduce debt at the same time will likely prove extremely hazardous financially.

It seems that the Trump entourage understands this, and that logically the unifying factor behind disparate policies from the creation of ‘DOGE’ to the enfeebling of NATO are driven by a brutal sense of austerity, that starts with the cutting down of all the international public goods that the US has invested in since Bretton Woods.

In this context, the ‘beggaring’ of Europe pushes the bill for European security back across the Atlantic and has shaped the debate in Europe towards greater debt accumulation (for example the debt brake is one of the most contentious topics for the new German government and the EU will soon embark on the issue of EU defence bonds). Japan, South Korea and Australia might be next.

In effect, the White House is using areas where America is exceptional – financial markets, the military and multinationals – to coerce its allies, and in the case of Ukraine to undermine them. Debt might be next.

The closest we have to a template for a Trump grand macro plan is a paper written by Stephen Miran, who may soon take up the role of head of the Council for Economic Advisers. The elements in this plan have popularly become known as the ‘Mar-A-Lago Accord’, which is not unlike the world debt conference idea I have written about in The Levelling, though my version takes place in the recently refurbished Raffles (Singapore).

One of the pillars of the cited ‘Mar-A-Lago Accord is that holders of Treasuries exchange these securities for very long-term loans (that might not provide a coupon). The result would be to restructure the maturity and fiscal burden of America’s debt load. It is a neat idea but will not work in practice. Any debt accord will likely need the impetus of a major financial crisis as a motivator, will need to restructure the debt of all the major economies and will entail a rewriting of financial regulations across the world (for pension funds for example).

In reality, an attempt to enact a Mar-a-Lago Accord, in the same fashion as the debate around NATO, may create aversion (distrust in) to US financial assets and the dollar. Whilst Europeans may not appreciate the extent to which a ‘beggar thy neighbour’ philosophy is driven by US security policy, the White House is underestimating the value that America’s wide ranging financial, diplomatic and commercial infrastructure bring it. An example is that close to 40% of the revenues of large American firms come from overseas.

In the short-term, we are also starting to witness the effects of austerity on the American economy. Though ‘hard’ data on the economy remain solid, the outlook will become very noisy in the next few months as government job cuts take hold and as social welfare cuts (notably in the mortgage industry) sow anxiety. Markets have started to become jittery too, amidst a belief that the administration is much more focused on lowering bond yields (and thus the cost of government debt) than boosting the stock market.

In a scenario where the (US) economy weakens, investors normally turn to Treasuries, but the prospect of a Mar-A-Lago Accord being foisted upon them could lead to a buyers’ strike. The public attack on president Zelensky has disabused diplomats of the intentions of the Trump White House, investors could be next.

Have a great week ahead,

Mike