Full Mettle Jacket

A week ago I started reading Admiral Jim Stavridis and Elliott Akerman’s second book, ‘2054’, which like the first (‘2034’) is a work of fiction designed to tell us about how our own world is evolving and the risks that will confront us. Without spoiling the plot, ‘2054’ demonstrates how new technologies can be deployed in nefarious ways, with the goal of turning the tide of geopolitics. However, as much as I enjoy the work of the Stavridis/Akerman team, my reaction to ‘2054’ was much the same as ‘2034’ (‘2034 – are we already there?’), which is that it has been rendered out of date by bizarre events in the real, political world

The detonation of over seventy years of American diplomacy and soft power by the various speeches and deeds of the Trump administration is a fin de siècle moment, that has drawn comment across the diplomatic world (the most pertinent was that of the Singaporean defence minister who described how he saw the USA moving from a force for ‘moral legitimacy’ to a landlord seeking rent’).

The worry now is that the US will treat its allies like enemies and its foes like friends. There was much consternation in Europe, but as this note has argued so many times, very few European countries have faced up to the challenges of the post-globalized world (Mario Draghi’s speech to the EU parliament last week put it very well…’do something!’).

There is now a furore over Eur 500 bn defence bonds, joint nuclear shields and defence equipment shopping lists. But, a more urgent task than buying fighter jets is the need for Europe to have a coherent security strategy. In a weekend where many are anticipating the results of the German election, a neglected development was the collapse of government formation talks between Austria’s centre-right OVP and the far-right FPO.

Some weeks ago, the parties had agreed on an economic programme, but could not settle on a common foreign policy, a critical stumbling point was oversight of the intelligence services (the OVP wanted to be in charge). This is a sensitive topic given that the FPO has a soft spot for the Kremlin, and specifically the fact that in 2018 the Herbert Kickl (FPO leader), when he was Austria’s interior minister, ordered an investigation into the country’s security services. Today, few of its EU peers share intelligence with Austria.

Reflecting that, the immediate challenge from Russia is infiltration, sabotage and manipulation across Europe (the Gerasimov doctrine and David Kilcullen’s work on Russian/Chinese tactics are both worth a read here ‘From Great War to Total War’). The EU has done relatively little to push back on this interference, and now has an urgent security (as well as defence) challenge.

This could take various forms.

The first is to penalise EU states that systematically go against the grain of the policies, values and interests of the Union. Hungary is the main offender here and whilst some EU funds have been withheld from Viktor Orban, the EU has in general failed to confront him. In the recent past there has been talk in the European parliament of excluding Hungary from the EU, which is technically difficult, but is a necessary part of a more ideologically consistent Europe, and one where bad actors face a penalty for their actions.

A second strand is to have much greater oversight over the movement of Russians in Europe, and of their capital. Vienna, Milan and the south of France, not to mention parts of Switzerland, are popular destinations for wealthy Russians and some European capitals are saturated with Russian money (Mark Hollingsworth’s book ‘Londongrad’ is instructive here as is Oliver Bullough’s ‘Butler to the World’). To emphasise the point, Russian interference in UK and lately Irish politics has not been aggressively countered, and my fear is that this is much worse in other countries like Germany.

Instead of clamouring to buy rocket launchers, Europe’s political classes have a lot to do domestically to shut the door on Russian interference in European affairs.

Then, on a more structural level, there is scope for much greater intelligence sharing across governments and joint task-forces on organised crime (gangs are a favourite extension of the Russian state). From the point of hardware, there is a need for increased joint use of satellites and electronic warfare collaboration.

The distinction between security and defence is an important and urgent one and a reminder of how complacent European governments have been. Whilst defence capabilities will take time to build up, the measures to be enacted in the security domain are less challenging to operationalise, but constitute a real test of European governments’ mettle.

Have a great week ahead,

Mike

Marmite

The number 13 tram in Zurich winds its way through the centre of the city before turning and pushing uphill to the Uetliberg. The inhabitants of the tram are typically older people and bank employees, but occasionally you might come across a few excited, wealthy individuals journeying to look at their gold in the Credit Suisse (now UBS of course) building at Uetlihof. The entrance to the building is on the 8^th floor, betraying a deep underground complex where it is said, the bank stores gold bars, and sometimes invites the owners of the gold to view their stash.

Those investors who own gold will be very happy. It has returned 40% in the past two years and is now closing in on the USD 3,000 level, despite a stronger dollar and high interest rates.

There are few assets like gold. The vast majority of investors do not hold it, nor have they a sense of how its price behaves. But there are others who are passionate about gold and hold large quantities of it in their portfolios. Finance theory suggests investors should hold 2% of gold in a portfolio, but my experience is that in practice, it is either 0% or greater than 10%. To that end gold is a ‘Marmite’ asset class, because like the Marmite spread, you either love it or hate it.

It used to be that a difficult interview question for graduates was to ask them what the drivers of the gold price are. Now that question is more likely to focus on the drivers of bitcoin. Bitcoin’s architects likely wanted it to behave like digital gold, but instead it seems to trade like digital Nasdaq futures on steroids.

The gold price has perhaps three drivers – the role of gold as a monetary variable, the effects of commodity or physical demand and its role as a store of value in times of crisis.

Typically gold as a ‘rival’ for paper money is driven by changes in the monetary environment – namely the value of the dollar and medium-term interest rates. For example, from the early 2000’s onwards the price of gold has moved inversely with the inflation adjusted yield on ten-year US bonds (rising bond yields tend to be bad for gold). But, in 2022, something funny happened – inflation adjusted bond yields rose, but gold kept rising and has not stopped since. Indeed, I now see more and more financial headlines that ‘gold is breaking out’, which is likely a sign that the ‘top’ is not far away.

The strength of the gold price is curious because in many quarters demand for gold has been muted – according to the Banque de France, demand for gold is made up of jewelry (49%), central banks (23%), financial investors (21%) and the electronics sector (7%).

In 2024, Chinese and Indian households have been buying more gold, and before that, emerging economy central banks – notably Russia and South Africa had been buyers, most probably to diversify out of dollars and euros given the risk of sanctions and asset confiscation. Financial holders of gold, exchange traded funds (ETF’s) have not been heavy buyers. Overall though, commercial and financial demand for gold has not been dramatically strong in the past eighteen months.

That still leaves a big chunk of gold’s outperformance unexplained (if it were only driven by the interest rate environment gold would likely be trading close to USD 2,000 given the stubbornness of high bond yields). There are likely two factors at play.

The first is technical. There is a short squeeze taking place in the gold market, which means that a lot of financial actors (bullion banks and speculators) have short positions in gold (hoping that the price will go down) and now have to buy gold to cover loss making positions. This short-squeeze is exacerbated by a spike in demand for physical gold because of fears of tariffs on gold and silver (from Canada – home to many gold miners).

The second factor that is more interesting and harder to calibrate is geopolitics. Gold is a pure store of value – an asset to run to when the world is turned upside down. For those who live adventurous lives, a belt with gold coins sown in is a good escape plan (I have met at least one person with this plan). In a week where the global security architecture has been dismantled by the Trump administration, the reasons for holding gold are clear.

The disintegration of relations between the US and China, the uncertainty caused by tariffs and generally weak government finances across the G2 and G7 countries are just a couple of more detailed reasons to own gold. In that sense it is a barometer of ‘Trump’s world’, but also highly susceptible to his actions – he could send gold much higher if he announces tariffs on gold, but the prospect that he could let Russia off the financial hook as it were, is a reason to call the top.

Have a great week ahead,

Mike

Remember the Washington Consensus?

Does anyone remember the Washington Consensus? Such a phrase might seem odd in today’s world but in the early 1990’s the notion of a ‘Washington Consensus’ was very powerful as a method for globalisation, and hotly debated by the left.

Globalisation worked well because, to be overly simplistic, it was facilitated by a very clear world order that helped to establish the rules of the ‘globalisation game’ and the norms associated with this. At their core, these rules were American, or at the very least they were made in Washington within the institutions that were set up to marshal the post-World War II world order, the IMF (International Monetary Fund), the World Bank and the United Nations in New York. America held the purse strings of these organisations and regular meetings at these institutions became a means of schooling ministers from both developing and emerging economies in the ways of American economic power.

These discussions aired what soon became known as the ‘Washington Consensus’ – effectively an approach to world economic development and globalisation, that was denounced by critics on the left as a neo-liberal policy recipe book. With the benefit of hindsight today, the Washington Consensus was valuable in the sense that it was a consensus, it encapsulated an approach that many countries were content to go along with as part of their first foray into real economic development.

Today, the Washington Consensus is in disarray. The institutions that it was built around, like the IMF are defunct, and others like the WTO have been undermined by both China and the US in recent years. The decision of the US to leave the World Health Organisation is another blow. The ‘Consensus’ is dead because there are now other competing methods as to how countries can develop, and of the independent paths they can take.

Here, an important milestone was Xi Jinping’s China Dream speech, in November 2012, which well before MAGA (Make America Great Again) coined the term ‘China Dream’ during a visit to the National Museum of China. Now, countries like Indonesia or Nigeria can try to follow the classical Western model of development, or China’s non-democratic, state led approach. Or, like Argentina and El Salvador, they can pursue the ‘Trumpian’ model that is taking a grip on Washington, but that is anything but a consensus.

Without going into day-by-day developments coming from the White House, the second Trump presidency can be seen as an early stage in the post-globalisation world order.

Globalisation was based on American economic and political strength and promulgated by the ‘Washington Consensus’ and the B-52’s of American capitalism (multinationals). Eventually globalisation ran out of steam, and events like Brexit, the first Trump presidency and the snuffing out of Hong Kong’s democracy shattered it. We are now in a multi-polar world where at least three large powers (EU, China and the US) do things increasingly differently (look at how they treat AI).

Uniquely, this Trump presidency represents an attempt to do something new and can be seen as an early chapter in the formation of the new world order, and to an extent its success depends on the will and the coherence of the groups of people that are driving the Trump project (from sectors like private equity, innovation and wealthy families). One stark difference with globalization is already clear. Globalization was built on the US being umbilically tied to much of the rest of the world, and vice versa, by flows of ideas, money, trade and people. In contrast, it now seems that Trump 2.0 relies on American exceptionalism, attempting to rise above the rest of the world, and in the process severing the relationships and ties built up since the end of the First World War.

For example, consider the words delivered to Canadians by President Kennedy in May 1961 ‘Geography has made us neighbors. History has made us friends. Economics has made us partners. And necessity has made us allies’ and how remarkably different they are to the way the Donald Trump has treated Canada.

In that context, the rest of the world may increasingly choose to avoid America, and the risk to ‘Exceptional America’, notably with the dollar as strong as it is, is that its financial power ebbs, in the way that of many other empires has. The template for this is expertly laid out in Barry Eichengren’s ‘Mars or Mercury’ paper that analysed the link between empires and their monies, though I feel that in the absence of obviously strong competing currencies, this thesis could take time to play out.

A more plausible side-effect of ‘exceptional’ America, is the advent of a new point of economic gravity, pinpointed at the UAE (United Arab Emirates). This is my ‘Fourth Pole’ thesis – that the UAE together with India and Saudi Arabia has the makings of a new pole of trade and commercial activity, with low regulatory barriers and that encompasses a potentially huge market (Prof Afshin Molavi calculates that there are 2.5bn bn people within five hours flying time of Abu Dhabi). The Mercosur trade deal between Latin America and the EU might also be the basis for a new trade corridor.

The other necessary outcome in a world where America is going its own way, is that Europe stops trying to contain Trump, and takes a far more aggressive stance with respect to its risk environment, notably Russia. The German election in two weeks’ time might be the start of that stance.

Have a great week ahead,

Mike

ChatCCP

Technology happens quickly. This time two years ago, few people had heard about ChatGPT, and few investors knew what Nvidia did. On January 6th 2023, I wrote a note entitled ‘Talos’ where I remarked …

’A recent development here is the arrival of ChatGPT an interactive ‘intelligent’ bot that has been developed by OpenAI (set up seven years ago to build socially constructive AI, and recently valued at USD 30bn). ChatGPT is catching on quickly, not least because students have found that it can write half decent essays. I recently tested it out, asking for a response to the question ‘Is globalization over?’- the result is below, and in my humble opinion is a good rendition of the kind of response that a ‘two handed economist’ might give (‘on one hand…on the other’). I think I can just about do better, and if there is any lesson to draw it is for human writers to be more opinionated, quirky or style driven in how they write. I am not out of a job just yet.

I am still writing, and don’t use ChatGPT to do so. In January 2023, my presumption was that because ChatGPT had already been in place for some time, investors knew about it and had factored it into share prices (the theory of efficient markets in finance says that all publicly available information is quickly reflected in market prices).

This was not the case, and with hindsight, I realise that students of economic and finance of the 1990’s spent far too much time imbibing the ‘efficient markets hypothesis’, which was a big thing at the time and the big guns of academic finance raged about it into the 2000’s. I suspect that more people today believe markets are rigged than efficient, with the rigging done by vampire squid type funds and central banks, to name a few culprits.

The performance of AI centric stocks (notably Nvidia) shows that the early promise of AI was underestimated, perhaps to the extent to which it is overestimated today. Indeed, the concentration of the top ten companies in the US stock market (they make up 40% of the market capitalisation) is as high as it only has been in 1930. In that context, the apparent supplanting of ChatGPT by DeepSeek (we might call it ‘Chatccp’) in the Apple app store is a reality check.

It is also an efficient markets check. I had seen the initial model test results from DeepSeek at the start of this year (Azeem Azhar’s blog had mentioned it back in November, and also as far back as December 2023). To that end the technology world has been well aware of DeepSeek for months, so it is a surprise, and another slap in the face for efficient markets hypothesis (I am still a little obsessed about this).

Whatever about efficient markets, the advent of DeepSeek is a reminder of how the cycle of innovation in economies works, and will have some commentators rushing for their Schumpeter. The Austrian economist coined the term ‘creative destruction’, but his views on capitalism are worth re-reading for he believed that it would undermine itself (different cohorts or corporates would effectively block the system) and collapse. His work on business cycles is also well overdue a comeback.

We don’t quite know whether DeepSeek (who claim to have produced superior model results compared to ChatGPT and Claude AI for a fraction of the cost) have been helped by the Chinese state, whether any espionage is involved nor the extent to which they have piggybacked on work already done by US based teams. Nor is it too important that the bandwidth of the model is restricted in China and that it is unlikely to be widely used in the West.

The important development is that the cost of production threshold for large AI models has been set much lower. Other cheaper models are on the way, Bytedance’s Doubao-1.5 or Moonshot’s Kimi k1.5 are two emerging examples.

To that end, the first phase in the AI boom now comes to an end. Much like other key technology infrastructure breakthroughs – railway (railway companies made up 50% of the stock market in 1900), automobiles (France dominated the auto market from 1903 to 1929, at times manufacturing half of the world’s cars) to the internet (anyone remember AOL or Netscape”) – the initial innovation garners huge amounts of capital, is expected to change the world, which it does but often not in the ways investors expect. The legacy is usually a new web of infrastructure.

In the next phase of AI, Investors will now not likely pay up for model developers but will focus on unique datasets, applications of AI (health) and the AI industrial supply chain – energy for AI for example (see last week’s note ‘Humphrey’).

The view of the stock market, which quickly rebounded, is that the consumer is the winner – that DeepSeek opens up the prospect of cheaper, better AI for common use, and I think the investor conversation will turn to how this impacts consumption patterns and the way people work (from police officers to teachers). The fact that the stock market took the positive view of the DeepSeek news suggests that the AI bubble in stocks is alive and well.

Elsewhere in AI, model development is accelerating in a sinister way. In a paper entitled ‘Frontier AI systems have surpassed the self-replicating red line’, scientists at Fudan university highlight how AI can build replicates of itself, and when this process runs into obstacles, demonstrate a survival instinct (such as rebooting hardware to fix errors). It strikes me that this is the real AI development we need to pay attention to.